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Many people today view the Internet as an inte-
gral part of everyday life. Online shopping, e-
mailing friends, even filing electronic tax forms
demonstrate the Internet's growing influence in
transforming societal habits around the world. As
the Internet continues to break barriers in tradi-
tional notions of communication, disagreements
emerge on how best to regulate this developing
medium.' Indeed, some of the hot communica-
tions topics today (e.g., online privacy, copyright,
spam) 2 center on the debate between preserving
the Internet's unfettered nature and imposing
greater government oversight. 3 One of the most
challenging questions courts now face concerns
the Internet's exact legal definition. 4 Does it con-
stitute a mere collection of wires and processors
or an actual, tangible location subject to tradi-
tional federal and state laws?5
Noah v. AOL Time Warne,6 represents a good ex-
ample of this dilemma. Here, a plaintiff at-
' See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (evaluating
the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Communica-
tions Decency Act in the Internet setting); Zeran v. Am. On-
line Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that §230 of
the Communications Decency Act granted AOL publisher
immunity from defamatory third party postings on its mes-
sage boards).
2 See generally, Michael Totty, E-Commerce (A Special Report):
Taming the Frontier: The Internet Was Going to be a Place Without
Rules, Without Borders; A Place Where Anything Goes; Well, Guess
What?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2003, at RIO (describing how
both the government and private sector are trying to regulate
commerce and protect consumers in the "freewheeling" In-
ternet environment).
3 See Doe v. Am. Online Inc., 783 So.2d 1010, 1013 (Fla.
2001) (deciding whether the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 pre-empts Florida law in holding an Internet Service
Provider liable for distributing defamatory messages).
4 See e.g.,-United States v. Am. Library Ass'n Inc., 539 U.S.
194, 204-08 (2003) (describing the difficulty in applying ei-
ther "traditional" or "designated" public forum analysis to In-
ternet access in public libraries).
5 See Access Now Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 227 F.
tempted to sue America Online ("AOL") for vio-
lating Title II of the Civil Rights Act ("Tide II") by
failing to remove hate messages in their Islamic
topic chat rooms. 7 The court ultimately rejected
this argument,8 holding that chat rooms do not
constitute a physical "place of public accommoda-
tion under Title II."'9 It also found that the Com-
munications Decency Act of 1996 (the "CDA")
gave Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"), such as
AOL, "publisher" immunity from the potentially
libelous messages of its members. 10
Noah raises a fundamental issue of whether In-
ternet chat rooms should "escape" federal regula-
tion simply because of their non-physical charac-
teristics. Some suggest that this serves as bad pre-
cedent, since laws like the Civil Rights Act enforce
against a particularly divisive social evil-racial
discrimination.' Others disagree with this inter-
pretation and point to our nation's traditional
protection of free expression and the dangers of
Supp.2d 1312, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (discussing the question
of whether an Internet website could be defined as a "place
of public accommodation" under Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act).
6 261 F. Supp.2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003).
7 Id. at 535 ("Plaintiff alleges that although he reported
every one of the alleged violations to AOL, AOL refused to
exercise its power to eliminate the harassment in the 'Beliefs
Islam' and 'Koran' chat rooms.").
8 Id. at 537.
9 Id. at 545. ("Although a chat room may serve as a vir-
tual forum through which AOL members can meet and con-
verse in cyberspace, it is not an 'establishment' under the
plain meaning of that term as defined by the statute.") (em-
phasis in original).
10 Id. at 537-38 (holding that "while parties that post in-
formation in Internet forums remain accountable under all
applicable federal and state laws, they cannot be reached in-
directly through the imposition of liability on the ISPs that
serve as intermediaries in posting the information.").
" See id. at 539 n.5 (pointing to Mr. Noah's argument
that granting ISPs immunity from Civil Rights Laws is "bad
policy").
COMMLAW CO
imposing content discrimination to satisfy the
"views of the majority. '12 Finding the balance be-
tween these two competing arguments poses a dif-
ficult challenge, especially when applying this
problem to the metaphysical chat room environ-
ment.
13
This Note argues that the Noah opinion cor-
rectly refrained from applying Title II to the chat
room environment. Although chat rooms closely
resemble traditional Title II outlets of societal in-
teraction, they still do not adequately fit into the
statutory definition of a physical "place of public
accommodation."1 4 In addition, applying tradi-
tional Civil Rights laws in this particular case may
be inappropriate.1 5 Since Congress passed Title II
in a different place and time,1 6 lawmakers could
never account for the development of new, freely
accessible platforms like Internet chat rooms or
the subsequent legislation designed to protect
it. 1 7
More importantly, imposing hate speech cen-
sorship duties on ISPs raises freedom of speech
concerns, as chat rooms now represent a valuable
forum for the public exchange of ideas."' While
private ISPs are free to censor postings on their
own, 19 forcing them to do so through government
regulation may amount to an unconstitutional
form of content regulation.
20
Part I of this Note summarizes the relevant legal
history leading to Noah's decision and describes
the statutory interpretations applying to chat
rooms. Part II gives a brief overview of Noah v.
AOL Time Warner and the court's rationale for dis-
12 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-392
(1992) (holding that a facially overbroad hate speech ordi-
nance could not overcome the First Amendment's provisions
simply because it enforced the majority's disapproval of ra-
cially discriminatory hate speech).
13 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 544-45 ("Although a chat
room or other online forum might be referred to metaphori-
cally as a 'location' or 'place,' it lacks the physical presence
necessary to constitute a place of public accommodation
under Title II.").
14 See id. at 540-45 (discussing the statutory language and
subsequent case law, all requiring a "physical" facility for a
valid Title II claim).
15 See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1270
(7th Cir. 1993) (holding that Title II did not apply to mem-
bership organizations not associated with physical facilities
and that the statute was not designed to "regulate a wide
spectrum of consensual human relationships").
16 See David Hudson, AOL Wins in Chat Room Suit, 2
No.22 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 2 (2003) (quoting Robert O'Neil,
Director of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection
of Free Expression, ". . . it is clear that 'in 1964, no one would
have thought of virtual places of public accommodation'").
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missing Noah's complaint. Part III provides an
analysis of the court's argument and demonstrates
how public accommodation law, the CDA, and
First Amendment principles all prevent Title II li-
ability. Finally, Part IV concludes by offering both
predictions and possible solutions to the ongoing
debate.
I. STATUTORY AND LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO NOAH
Understanding Noah v. AOL Time Warner re-
quires a basic knowledge of the three main issues
presented in the case. Section A begins this over-
view by describing Title II of the Civil Rights Act
and the subsequent legal interpretations of a
"place of public accommodation." Section B ana-
lyzes the CDA and illustrates how its language
grants ISPs a broad liability loophole regarding
the online chat room postings produced by its
members. Finally, Section C examines the legal
history of hate speech and how the First Amend-
ment affects the government's ability to censor
these statements.
A. Title II of the Civil Rights Act
In 1964, Congress passed Title II of the Civil
Rights Act, which attempted to stop the wide-
spread practice of excluding African-Americans
from access to public areas. 21 Daniel v. Pau2 2 best
summarized Title II's purpose by recalling Con-
gress's intent of "remov[ing] the daily affront and
17 See id; see also discussion infra Part III.B, which de-
scribes how the Internet's open accessibility to anyone with
Internet access tends to disprove the "discriminatory intent"
necessary for a valid Title II claim and how the CDA grants
ISPs immunity from suits dealing with third party postings.
18 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 540 (citing Zeran v. Am.
Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) by discussing the
CDA's role in balancing free speech with the enforcement of
federal laws); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
391 (1992) (holding a municipal "fighting words" ordinance
facially invalid since it served as an impermissible form of
content regulation).
19 See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 948 F.
Supp. 436, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that a private ISP
did not violate a plaintiff's free speech rights by restricting
their e-mails because ISPs were not State actors).
20 See discussion infra Part III.C.1 (arguing that the
forced censorship of protected hate speech not meeting
Chaplinsky's "fighting words" test may be an inappropriate
form of government-sponsored content regulation).
21 42 U.S.C. §2000a (2000); see also H.R. REP. No. 88-914,
at 18 (1964).
22 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
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humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of
access to facilities ostensibly open to the general
public." 23 Consequently, courts have generally
adopted a broad view when interpreting the stat-
ute.
24
Title II consists of two primary parts: Section A,
which deals with its "equal access" provision and
Section B, which describes its "interstate com-
merce" requirement.25 Section A defines "equal
access" as follows, "[A]ll persons shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, ser-
vices, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accom-
modations of any place of public accommodation,
as defined in this section, without discrimination
or segregation on the ground of race, color, relig-
ion, or national origin."26 Section B goes on fur-
ther to state that "places of public accommoda-
tion," which include "lodgings; facilities princi-
pally engaged in selling food for consumption on
the premises; gasoline stations; [or] places of ex-
hibition or entertainment,"27 must also "affect in-
terstate commerce" to be covered by this sec-
tion.
2 8
1) A Physical "Place of Public Accommodation"
What exactly is a "place of public accommoda-
tion?" Title II defines "place" within four speci-
fied categories: (1) "establishment[s] which
provid[e] lodging to transient guests," (2)
"facilit[ies] principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises," (3) "place is] of
23 Id. at 307-08 (quoting H.R. Rep No. 914, at 18).
24 See id. at 307 ("But it does not follow that the scope of
§[2000a] (b) (3) should be restricted to the primary objects of
Congress' concern when a natural reading of it language
would call for broader coverage.").
25 42 U.S.C. §2000a. The title of the section is "Prohibi-
tion against discrimination or segregation in places of public
accommodation."
26 Id. §2000a(a).
27 42 U.S.C. §2000a(b) (2000).
28 Id. §2000a(b)-(c) ("For purposes of this section, 'com-
merce' means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transporta-
tion, or communication among the several States.").
29 42 U.S.C. §2000a(b).
30 See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d
532, 542-43 (2003) (citing Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am.., 993
F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993) and Clegg v. Cult Awareness Net-
work, 18 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1994)) ("[T]o ignore this require-
ment is to ignore the plain language of the statute and to
render the list of example facilities provided by the statute
superfluous.").
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Miller v.
Amusement Enter. Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968); United
exhibition or entertainment," or (4) the catch all
provision-"any establishment . ..which is physi-
cally located within the premises of any establish-
ment" listed in this statute. 29 Despite this seem-
ingly clear definition, courts remain split on
whether one can extend the definition of "place"
beyond the written word.
3y1
One such disagreement concerns the "physical"
aspect of the term "place of public accommoda-
tion." 3' The majority of Title II cases have dealt
with the denial of access to actual physical
places.3 2 Nevertheless, some plaintiffs have tried
to impose Title II jurisdiction on non-physical
places (e.g., membership organizations) by rely-
ing on a broader interpretation of the statutory
language.3 3 Perhaps the most recent examples of
these attempts were the Title II cases against the
Boys Scouts of America for its stringent member-
ship policy.
34
In Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America and Boys Scouts of
America v. Dale, the plaintiffs alleged that the Boy
Scouts violated Title II by denying them member-
ship based on religion 35 and sexual preference.
36
Both sought to define the Boy Scouts membership
organization as a "place of public accommoda-
tion" by claiming that a broad reading of "place of
exhibition or entertainment" included the group
within Title II.37 "'[T]he fact that [the Boy
Scouts] offer entertainment to the public at vari-
ous locations, all of which are 'places,'. . . subjects
them to the strictures of Title I' "38 The court in
Welsh rejected this argument, holding that the
States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 894 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1993).
33 See, e.g., Welsh, 993 F.2d 1267; Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). In these two cases, the plaintiffs
tried to equate the Boy Scouts with a "place of public accom-
modation" simply because the organization met in public
places. Welsh, 993 F.2d 1267; Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640 (2000).
34 Both plaintiffs were denied membership for failing to
satisfy the Boy Scout's membership policy. Welsh, 993 F.2d
1267; Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
35 Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1268 ("[Plaintiff] Elliott Welsh and
his seven year-old [sic] son Mark have brought suit asking the
United States Courts to force the Boy Scouts of America to
accept Mark as a member despite the fact that he refuses to
comply with its Constitution and By-laws and affirm his belief
in God.").
36 Dale, 530 U.S. at 644 ("Respondent is James Dale, a
former Eagle Scout whose adult membership [as a Scoutmas-
ter] in the Boy Scouts was revoked when the Boy Scouts
learned that he is an avowed homosexual and gay rights ac-
tivist.").
37 Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1268-69; Dale, 530 U.S. at 645.
38 Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1269 (citing Appellants' brief).
2004]
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definition of "place" must be drawn from the stat-
ute's enumerated categories. 39 As such, the court
noted that Title II mostly referenced physical facili-
ties and did not include membership organiza-
tions, like the Boy Scouts, within its definition of
"places of public accommodation." 40
The majority in Welsh found that equating a
membership organization with a "place of public
accommodation" required "a close connection to
a particular facility."4 1 The court reasoned that
only Congress had the authority to alter the stat-
ute's literal meaning with the plaintiff's expansive
view.42 The majority further noted that a broad
Title II interpretation only applied to situations
involving "denial of access to public facilities."
43
Since the Boy Scouts were never tied to one par-
ticular physical facility, they could not be consid-
ered a "place of public accommodation."
44
In Dale, the Supreme Court briefly touched
upon the "physicality" requirement of a "place of
public accommodation." 45 Although Dale ad-
dressed a different law and issue (a New Jersey
public accommodation statute and freedom of as-
sociation) than Welsh (Title II and religious dis-
crimination), the Court nonetheless criticized the
New Jersey Supreme Court for not linking a non-
physical membership organization to "[a] place of
public accommodation." 46 The Court noted that
many Federal Circuit decisions like Welsh ap-
peared to mandate a physical facility requirement
in Title II cases.47 Thus, the majority found the
state court's broader reading of "place of public
39 Id. ("The clear language of the statute mandates a dif-
ferent conclusion, for we must always be cognizant of the fact
that 'the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used."' (quoting Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962))).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1275.
42 Id. at 1271 ("Only after Congress has had the opportu-
nity for deliberation and reflection should a radical change
of the nature the plaintiffs propose be enacted.").
43 Id. at 1270 ("It is only in this context-denial of access
to public facilities-that courts must interpret Title II
broadly." (citing Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08
(1969))).
44 Id. at 1272.
45 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)
(holding that a New Jersey public accommodation law vio-
lated the First Amendment rights of the Boy Scouts by forc-
ing the organization to admit a gay Scoutmaster).
46 Id. at 657.
47 See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d
532, 542, n.7 (2003) (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 657, n.3).
48 Id. (illustrating that both Dale and Noah find that the
New Jersey decision represents the only case linking a mem-
accommodation" was the exception to the
norm. 48
The Ninth Circuit in Clegg v. Cult Awareness Net-
work also agreed with Welsh's reasoning.49 The ap-
pellate court held that a Cult Awareness group
did not constitute a "place of public accommoda-
tion" because defining a membership organiza-
tion as such would "obfuscate the term 'place'
and render nugatory the examples Congress pro-
vides to illuminate the meaning of that term.
'50
Although the Cult Awareness Network offered the
public a variety of goods and services (i.e., pam-
phlets and social awareness), the membership or-
ganization was not tied to any physical facility such
as a restaurant, recreational facility, or theater.
51
Since the defendant association never denied the
plaintiff access to a physical establishment, the
Clegg court found that Title II never applied to the
plaintiffs discrimination case. 52
Despite the abundance of decisions that fol-
lowed Welsh and Clegg's reasoning, some Circuits
endorsed a broader interpretation of "place of
public accommodation. '" 53 This mainly occurred
in public accommodation cases dealing with the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 54 Al-
though a different statute, Title III of the ADA has
an "equal access" anti-discrimination provision al-
most identical to Title J.55 More notably however,
the ADA has a more expansive list of "places or
public accommodation," with twelve categories as
opposed to Title II's four.56 This includes Title
II's specified locations (lodgings, restaurants, and
bership organization like the Boy Scouts to a "place of public
accommodation").
49 18 F.3d 752 (3d Cir. 1994).
50 Id. at 755.
51 Id. at 756 ("These facts are insufficient to establish
that the goods or services are sold, purchased, performed, or
engaged in from any public facility or establishment.").
52 Id. ("The facilities where the [group's meetings] take
place no doubt are 'places,' but Clegg fails to allege that Cult
Awareness has any connection to a particular place of public
accommodation.").
53 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 543 (citing plaintiff's reli-
ance on the First Circuit decision in Carparts Distribution
Ctr. Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass'n. of New England Inc.).
54 Id.
55 42 U.S.C. §12182(a) (2000) ("No individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment . . . of any place of public accommodation
56 Id. at §12181(7) (F); see also Carparts Distribution Ctr.
Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass'n. of New England Inc., 37 F.3d
12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Sierra Club v. Lawson, 2. F.3d
462, 467 (1993)).
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theaters) along with other facilities such as retail
stores, transportation centers, and zoos.
5 7
In Carparts Distribution Ctr. Inc. v. Automotive
Wholesalers Assoc. of New England Inc.,58 the First
Circuit held that "places of public accommoda-
tion" are not limited to "actual physical struc-
tures." The court found the ADA definition of
"place of public accommodation" ambiguous, fo-
cusing particularly on the inclusion of "travel ser-
vice" within the statute and noting that the term
could either represent an actual travel agency or a
non-physical toll-free telephone travel "club."60
The court further concluded that the ADA's
"broad sweep" supported a comprehensive break-
down of any barriers to a disabled person 6' and
that imposing a restrictive view would "severely
frustrate Congress's intent" with the ADA.62 Thus,
the lack of "physical boundaries or physical entry"
to the ADA's Title III public accommodation defi-
nition permits a finding that a trade association,
which administers an employee insurance plan,
could qualify as a "place" despite its non-physical
nature.
63
Like the First Circuit, the Seventh Circuit in Doe
v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 6 4 appeared to
endorse the idea of a broader "place of public ac-
commodation" definition. 65 In fact, it seemed to
extend its provisions significantly beyond the
physical world. 66 In holding a health insurance
57 42 U.S.C §12181 (7) (F); see also Carparts Distribution Ctr.
Inc., 37 F.3d at 19.
58 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
59 Id. at 19 ("This ambiguity, considered together with
agency regulations and public policy concerns, persuades us
that the phrase is not limited to actual physical structures.")
(emphasis added).
60 Id. ("It would be irrational to conclude that persons
who enter an office to purchase services are protected by the
ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over the
telephone or by mail are not. Congress could not have in-
tended such an absurd result.").
61 Jd. (citing 42 U.S.C. §12101(b) (2000) and the Con-
gressional legislative history in H.R.Rep. No. 485, pt.2, at 99
(1990)).
62 Id. at 20 (arguing that Congress did not set a limit to
physical facilities when passing the ADA and that doing so
would contradict its intention to open up all facilities to dis-
abled people).
63 See id. Although the Court did not decide whether the
defendant's insurance plan was in fact a "place of public ac-
commodation," it found that the district court could not dis-
miss plaintiffs claim simply because the plan was a "non
physical" entity. Id.
64 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
65 Id. at 564-65.
66 See id. at 559 (citing Carparts and broadening its public
accommodation definition to the electronic world).
policy subject to the ADA's Title III, the court in
Mutual of Omaha found that the statute extended
not only to "hotel[s], restaurant[s], [and] den-
tist's office[s]" but also to "website[s], or [any]
other facility (whether in physical space or in elec-
tronic space). 6 7 Thus, the ruling would seem to
suggest that any Internet product, whether a web-
site or even a chat room, could be considered a
"place of public accommodation. '" 68
However, some ADA courts rejected Mutual of
Omaha's broader definition, and similar to the Ti-
tle II cases focused on the physical aspect of a
"place of public accommodation." 69 In Access Now
Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.,70 the court held that
Southwest's ticketing website did not violate Title
III, even though it was not fully accessible to blind
people. 7' The court relied on the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's holding in Rendon v. Valleycrest Prod. Ltd. ,72
which stated that for the ADA to apply, a "nexus"
must exist "between the challenged service and
the premises of the public accommodation.
'" 73
Thus, since the Southwest website was not a physi-
cal location, no tangible relationship existed that
could link Title III's "equal access" requirement
with the plaintiff's discrimination allegation.
7 4
2) A "Place of Public Exhibition or Entertainment"
Besides the "physicality" issue, courts also split
67 Id.
68 See id.; see also Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F.
Supp.2d 532, 544 n.Il (E.D. Va. 2003) (emphasizing Mutual
of Omaha's use of "web site" and "electronic space").
69 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 543-44 (pointing to ADA
cases requiring a physical facility: Parker v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997), Weyer v. Twen-
tieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000).
70 227 F. Supp.2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
71 Id. at 1321 ("[T]he Internet website at issue here is
neither a physical, public accommodation itself as defined by
the ADA, nor a means to accessing a concrete space such as
the specific television studio in Rendon"); see also Noah, 261 F.
Supp.2d at 544.
72 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
"Who Wants to Be a Millionaire" game show violated Title III
by not making their telephone screening game accessible to
the deaf). The court found a Title III "nexus" between the
telephone service and a physical facility because the tele-
phone device served as a necessary conduict for participants
to enter the television studio. Id.
73 Access Now Inc., 227 F. Supp.2d at 1321 (quoting
Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1284 n.8).
74 Id. ("Thus, because the Internet website, southwest.
com, does not exist in any particular geographic location,
Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that Southwest's website
impedes their access to a specific, physical, concrete space
such as a particular airline ticket counter or travel agency.").
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on what exactly constitutes a "place of public exhi-
bition or entertainment" within Title 11.75 The
statute defines a "place of entertainment" as one
which "affects interstate commerce" by "customa-
rily present[ing] films, performances, athletic
teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertain-
ment which move in commerce. '7 6 Examples in-
clude a "motion picture house, theater, concert
hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhi-
bition or entertainment." 7 7 Despite the lan-
guage's apparent plain meaning, many courts see
the wording as "obscure" and tend to adopt a
broad meaning of the term "entertainment.
7 8
Thus, courts not only include movie houses, but
also swimming pools 79 and snack bars in recrea-
tional parks.
80
In Daniel v. Paul, the Supreme Court extended
Tide II's "entertainment" interpretation to in-
clude both direct and indirect forms of entertain-
ment.8 1 Not only did Title II apply when the estab-
lishment's customers were "spectators," it also ap-
plied to situations where customers provided the
entertainment through utilization of the establish-
ment's facilities, such as access to a lake or snack
facilities.8 2 Thus, anytime a "place of public ac-
commodation" either offers the entertainment or
provides the means of entertainment, it will be
subject to Title II's anti-discriminatory access pro-
visions.
8 3
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Baird8 4 took
Daniel's holding a step further. The court found
75 Compare United States v. Baird, 85 F.3d 450 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that a retail convenience store was a "place of
entertainment" due to the presence of a video games within
the store's premises) with Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993
F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Boy Scouts of
America membership organization could not be a "place of
entertainment" since they were not connected to any physical
facilities).
76 42 U.S.C. §2000a(c) (2000).
77 Id. at §2000a(b)(3).
78 See Miller v. Amusement Enter. Inc., 394 F.2d 342 (5th
Cir. 1968) (holding that an amusement park fit into Title II's
"place of public accommodation").
79 See United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 894 F.2d
83 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a club's swimming pool af-
fected interstate commerce by providing recreational access
to out of state members).
80 See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
81 See id. at 305-06 (interpreting a broad intent when
Congress defined a "place of entertainment").
82 Id. at 305. Justice Brennan noted that "place of en-
tertainment" included recreational facilities like the Lake
Nixon Club because they provided leisurely activities and "ad-
vertise[d] itself as such." Id.
83 Id. at 307 (arguing that a "natural reading" of the stat-
that a 7-Eleven retail convenience store, which by
itself may not qualify as a Title II establishment,
became a "place of entertainment" by merely pos-
sessing two video arcade games within its prem-
ises.8 5 Since "people play video games to amuse
themselves," their presence within the 7-Eleven
automatically brought a Title II obligation to the
store's owners.8 6 The court stated that it did not
matter whether the video games constituted a "pe-
ripheral" component of the store's activities.
8 7
Any "entertainment" aspect within a public facility
would come under Title II since the statute's goal
of providing "equal access" would be frustrated
otherwise.88 However, even this expansive view
has some limitations.
In Halton v. Great Clips Inc.,89 an Ohio district
court held that a hair salon was not subject to Ti-
tle II's provisions despite being located in a shop-
ping center. 90 Even though Title II "covered" es-
tablishments (restaurants) surrounded the hair
salon, the court did not feel justified in extending
Title II liability for actions beyond the salon
owner's control.91 Although the hair salon's own-
ers decided to locate in a shopping mall, they
could not influence who the other tenants would
be (i.e., "recreational" establishments). 92 Despite
the legal precedent of broadly reading "entertain-
ment," the court found no "entertainment" activi-
ties within the hair salon, reasoning that Congress
could have easily amended "public accommoda-
tion" to include retail stores within the statute.
93
ute's language supports this broader notion).
84 85 F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 1996).
85 Id. at 453-54 (demonstrating that the presence of
video arcade machines made the 7-Eleven store a "place of
entertainment").
86 Id.
87 Id. at 454 (arguing that 7-Eleven's "place of entertain-
ment" linkage comes under §2000a(b) (4) not (b) (2), which
only required proximity to a covered establishment).
88 Id. (noting the history of segregation in this country
and the government's compelling interest in providing equal
access to minorities).
89 94 F. Supp.2d 856 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
90 Id. at 862 (demonstrating that §2000a does not cover
retail establishments like a hair salons).
91 Id. at 863. The plaintiff in Halton attempted to link
the hair salon with a "place of public accommodation" under
the statute's catch all provision-§2000a(b) (4). See id.
92 Id. (arguing that tenants in shopping malls change
every year, leaving an "inconsistent result" under Title II if
the court found the hair salon to be a "place of public accom-
modation").
93 Id. at 862 ("Moreover, if Congress wanted to include,
within the meaning of the statute, other types of establish-
ments such as a service establishment, it could have amended
[Vol. 12
Chatting Up a Storm
Without the reference, the court was hesitant in
interpreting Title II otherwise.
9 4
Like Halton, Welsh did not automatically inter-
pret "place of exhibition or entertainment"
broadly.95 Even though the "[Boy Scouts] of-
fer[ed] entertainment to the public at various lo-
cations, all of which are 'places,' "96 the Seventh
Circuit declined to link a "membership organiza-
tion" as a "place of entertainment."9 7 The court
reasoned that Title II's purpose was to "regulate
facilities as opposed to gatherings of people."98
Thus, the phrase "places of entertainment" ap-
plies to actual places rather than mere "entertain-
ing" gatherings. 99 Courts may broadly interpret
"places of entertainment," just as long as they
somehow connect to physical places. 10 0 Most
membership organizations however, do not fit
into this category. 10
B. The Communications Decency Act: An ISP
Loophole?
In 1996, Congress passed the CDA,10 2 which
originally regulated obscene materials'0 3  and
granted ISPs publisher immunity from the defam-
atory Internet messages of its members.' 0 4 Several
civil liberties organizations, notably the American
Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), immediately at-
tacked the "obscene material" content regulation
section.' 0 5 This resulted in the Supreme Court de-
Tide II; after all, Congress has over three decades to do
this.").
94 Id. ("This inaction by Congress could not be a mere
oversight or an expectation that courts would broadly inter-
pret the statute to include basically any type of establishment
because Congress has subsequently defined 'public accom-
modation' more broadly.").
95 Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269 (7th
Cir. 1993).
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1270 (arguing that the purpose of Title II did
not include regulating social groups).
98 Id. at 1269.
99 See id. (noting that the Boy Scouts constituted a group
of people not an actual place).
100 See id. at 1270 (discussing when courts may use a
broad interpretation in Title II with regard to physical lo-
cales).
101 Id.; but see Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1272 (summarizing occa-
sions when membership organizations were "places of public
accommodation" under Title II due to their close association
with physical facilities (e.g., a YMCA health club in Smith v.
YMCA of Montgomery, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972), where
the club membership allowed access to a gym/pool)).
102 47 U.S.C. §§223, 230-31 (2000).
103 Id. §223(a), (d) (prohibiting the transmission of ob-
claring it "facially overbroad" and "unconstitu-
tional." 10 6 However, Section 230 (the ISP pub-
lisher immunity) remained intact and was subse-
quently upheld in several federal and state court
cases. 107
1) Section 230: Protecting the Internet's Forum of
Discussion
Congress passed Section 230 in recognition of
the Internet's expanding influence within Ameri-
can society. 10 8 It noted the Internet's "unique"
role in providing a "forum for a true diversity of
political discourse [or] cultural development"'0 9
and the subsequent federal importance in
"preserv[ing] [its] vibrant and competitive free
market" nature." 0 Thus, Congress provided that
no ISP "shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider."" 1 By enacting this
provision, Congress sought to both protect the In-
ternet's role as an unencumbered arena of public
discussion 1 2 and to encourage ISPs to self-regu-
late by removing federal constraints.
1 13
Section 230 did lay out four important excep-
tions that would not absolve ISPs from federal and
state liability." 4 The statute would have no effect
on any criminal law procedures (e.g., child sexual
exploitation), 1 5 or on intellectual property cases,
such as copyright violations. 1 6 In addition, state
scene materials to known minors over the Internet).
104 Id. §230.
105 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that
these CDA provisions were content-based blanket restrictions
which were facially overbroad and in violation of the First
Amendment).
106 Id. The Court believed that the statute's definition of
"indecent" and "patently offensive" was too vague and ambig-
uous, making enforcement actions by the government arbi-
trary and unconstitutional in a number of cases. Id.
107 See Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir.
1997); Doe v. Am. Online Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001);
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). See
also Michael E. Adler and Henri P. Marcial, Internet Listservs
and Newsgroups: Potential Pitfalls and Legal Ramifications,
19 ACCA DOCKET 79 (2001).
108 See 47 U.S.C. §230(a).
109 Id. §230(a) (3).
110 Id. §230(b) (2).








laws consistent with Section 230's provisions still
applied as well as actions under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986.1 1 So while
Congress encouraged the Internet's development,
it did not grant ISPs total immunity.I18 Instead, it
tried to find an appropriate balance between pro-
tecting free expression and the enforcement of
existing federal laws.' 19
2) The Court's Interpretation of Section 230
of the CDA
Prior to the CDA's enactment, courts relied on
their own judgment in determining whether an
ISP should bear responsibility for their members'
libelous or obscene statements. 120 In Cubby Inc. v.
CompuServe Inc, 121 a New York Federal District
Court denied a plaintiffs libel claim because
CompuServe, acting as a "distributor" rather than
a "publisher," never knew about the defamatory
postings on the ISP's "Journalism" bulletin
board.' 22 In contrast, Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prod-
igy Services, Co. 123 found an ISP accountable when
it made a "conscious choice" to regulate the con-
tent of its bulletin boards, yet through inadver-
tence failed to properly screen a member's
libelous postings. -'2 4 Thus, once the ISP decided
to regulate the bulletin board, the court found
"publisher" liability for their members' Internet
messages. 1
25
The CDA resolved this debate by overruling
Stratton Oakmont with Zeran v. America Online,
Inc., 126 which became the signature case affirming
the statute's ISP exception. In Zeran, the Fourth
117 Id. §230(e) (3), (4).
118 See id. §230(b)(5); see also Doe v. Am. Online, Inc.,
783 So.2d 1010, 1019-1028 (Fla. 2001) (LewisJ., dissenting)
(arguing that the CDA did not exempt ISPs from distributor
liability or child pornography).
119 47 U.S.C. §230(b).
120 See Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th
Cir. 1997) (describing the evolution and history leading up
to the passage of §230 of the CDA).
121 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
122 Id. at 141 ("Because CompuServe, as a news distribu-
tor, may not be held liable if it neither knew nor had reason
to know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville statements,
summary judgment in favor of CompuServe on the libel
claim is granted.").
123 23 Media L. Rep (BNA) 1794 (NY Sup. Ct. 1995).
124 Id. at 13 ("PRODIGYs conscious choice, to gain the
benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater
liability than CompuServe and other computer networks that
made no such choice.").
125 Id. at 10-13. By advertising "monitoring technolo-
Circuit pointed to Congress's intent with the CDA
to "not deter harmful online speech through the
separate route of imposing tort liability on compa-
nies that serve as intermediaries for other parties'
potentially injurious messages."' 12 7 The court
noted that Congress specifically removed "pub-
lisher" liability from ISPs to encourage self-regula-
tion, 128 and that Section 230's provisions equally
applied to "distributor" liability.' 2 9 In other words,
an ISP will not be held liable for its members' de-
famatory statements, whether they are aware of
them or not.
130
The Fourth Circuit in Zeran emphasized the fu-
tility of attempting to impose automatic liability
on ISPs. 131 The court reasoned that the Internet,
as opposed to print publishing, has thousands of
messages posted every minute, thereby making it
virtually impossible for ISPs to monitor postings
effectively.1 32 Therefore, Congress created Sec-
tion 230 to encourage ISPs to creatively attack the
problem themselves, without resorting to shutting
down their posting services to avoid liability.1
3 3
Thus, the plaintiff in Zeran could not hold AOL
accountable for failing to speedily remove
libelous statements from their online bulletin
boards.
13 4
Most jurisdictions adopted Zeran's stance, in-
cluding state courts like Florida in Doe v. America
Online, Inc.135 In Doe, the Florida Supreme Court
held that Section 230 of the CDA pre-empted
Florida law in permitting "distributor" liability
against AOL for failing to remove written chat
room messages advertising child pornography
products. 136 Although a publisher may be respon-
gies" over the board's content, the court believed that the
ISP exercised "editorial control" and were thus liable for all
postings under the theory of "publisher" liability. Id.
126 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
127 Id. at 330-31.
128 Id. at 331 (citing Stratton Oakmont and 47 U.S.C.
§230(b) (4) (2000)).
129 Id. at 331-32. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs
contention that the absence of a "distributor" immunity ref-
erence within the CDA meant it was applicable. Id.
130 See id.
1'1 Id. at 333.
132 Id. (arguing that the instantaneous nature of Internet
message boards precludes "distributor" liability).
133 Id. at 331 (noting that "distributor" liability would de-
feat the CDA's encouragement of self-regtlation since it
would be too costly for ISPs to monitor all questionable
messages).
134 Id. at 328, 335.
135 783 So.2d 1010, 1013, 1018 (Fl. 2001).
136 Id. at 1015-16. This would be different if the third
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sible under Florida tort law if they knew about the
defamatory statements, the court would not ex-
tend liability to AOL since under the CDA, they
were neither liable as a "publisher" nor recog-
nized as a "distributor" of the information. 11
7
Therefore, both Zeran and the CDA rendered the
plaintiff's complaint invalid, since AOL neither
participated in nor endorsed the defamatory chat
room messages in question.
138
The dissent in Doe, however, questioned this
CDA interpretation. Justice Lewis attacked the
analysis in Zeran, arguing that the CDA only ap-
plied in cases where ISPs had no notice of the
third party defamatory messages.' 3 9 Justice Lewis
also pointed to the "publisher/distributor" dis-
tinction in tort law and reasoned that the CDA's
language only exempted AOL from "publisher"
but not "distributor" liability.' 4°c Because AOL
knew about the chat room messages and did noth-
ing about them, the ISP should not "reap the eco-
nomic benefits flowing from the activity." 14 1 More-
over, Lewis reasoned that the CDA was meant to
encourage freedom of expression, not enable the
child pornography industry-an area specifically
excluded from First Amendment protection.
142
Overall, courts overwhelmingly endorse Zeran's
reading of the CDA and grant ISPs both "pub-
lisher" and "distributor" liability. 143 Nevertheless,
party posted child pornography images because these forms
of communications do not have any First Amendment pro-
tections and may be illegal under federal and state criminal
laws. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
137 Id. at 1017. The court linked the actions Doe re-
quested with the immunities granted by the CDA to ISPs. Id.
138 See id. ("[l]t is precisely the liability based upon negli-
gent failure to control the content of users' publishing of al-
legedly illegal postings on the Internet that is the gravamen
of Doe's alleged cause of action.") (emphasis added).
139 See id. at 1019. The dissent argued that the CDA does
not "totally exonerate and insulate an ISP from responsibility
where, as here, it is alleged that an ISP has acted as a know-
ing distributor of [child pornography] material . . . by taking
absolutely no steps to curtail continued dissemination ...
when it had the right and power to do so." Id.
140 Id. at 1020-23.
141 Id. at 1024-25 (believing that the majority's interpre-
tation of the CDA "flies in the face of the very purpose" of
the CDA by rewarding complacency).
142 Id. at 1026-27.
143 See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44
(D.D.C. 1998) (holding that an ISP could not be held liable
for allowing its subscribers access to alleged defamatory
statements posted on the Drudge Report website); Ben Ezra,
Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir.
2000) (holding that the CDA granted AOL immunity from
an inaccurate stock price quotation provided by a third party
Justice Lewis's dissent suggests that the interpreta-
tion may be open to argument, leaving the subject
open to further circuit debate.
C. Hate Speech and the First Amendment: An
Overview of the Case Law
Since most of the prior Internet cases dealt with
libel, a discussion of hate speech and the First
Amendment will be helpful due to the nature of
Noah's chat room messages.' 44 The First Amend-
ment, except under certain limited circum-
stances, has historically protected hate speech,
145
or speech offensive to a particular race, religion,
or ethnic group.146 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
147
describes the unique situation when First Amend-
ment protections do not apply, mainly when hate
speech constitutes "fighting words" or speech "by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace."'148 In Chaplin-
sky, the Court recognized a New Hampshire stat-
ute's legitimate goal in protecting the public from
unnecessary violence (group "fighting words")
while still recognizing a citizen's rights to legiti-
mate free expression. 49 In other words, the State
may have a compelling interest in banning speech
designed to incite a riot, but may not in speech
having no effect on public safety.15
0
financial information source); Doe v. Am. Online Inc., 783
So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001) (reaffirming a lower court decision
dismissing a plaintiff's state negligence claim regarding a
third party posting in one of the ISP's Internet chat rooms).
144 See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d
532, 535 (2003) (detailing the content of the messages in
question).
145 See generally Michael Siegel, Comment, Hate Speech,
Civil Rights and the Internet: TheJurisdictional and Human Rights
Nightmare, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 375 (1999) (pointing to
the differences between the United States and other foreign
countries (Germany and Singapore) in regulating hate
speech and how the United States traditionally guards its citi-
zen's free expression from government oversight).
146 Id. (quoting Human Rights Watch's definition of
hate speech).
147 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
148 Id. at. 572 (determining that fighting words are
"no[t] [an] essential part of any exposition of ideas").
149 See id. at 573.
[W]e are unable to say that the limited scope of the stat-
ute as this construed contravenes the constitutional right
of free expression. It is a statute narrowly drawn and lim-
ited to define and punish specific conduct lying within
the domain of state power, the use in a public place of
words likely to cause a breach of the peace.
Id. (emphasis added).
15(1 See id. at 573.
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1) "Mode" v. "Content:" First Amendment
Protections Specific to Hate Speech
Such was the case in R.A. V v. City of St. Pau
1 5
1
where the Supreme Court held that a municipal
ordinance banning hate speech was facially inva-
lid because it banned both unprotected "fighting
words" and speech, which by itself does not "in-
flict[ ] injury or tend[ ] to incite immediate vio-
lence." 15 2 The Court reasoned that while the gov-
ernment has the power to regulate fighting words
that have the tendency to promote violence (the
mode of speech), it cannot regulate their belief of
a particular idea (the content of the speech).1
53
Because the St. Paul statute banned racially mo-
tivated hate speech in all forms (whether they in-
cited violence or not), the Court believed it
served as a form of content regulation of a per-
son's ideology. 54 Although hate speech by itself
serves no public interest, the majority felt that the
government could not censor the words solely
due to its distastefulness. 155 The Court reasoned
that the First Amendment protects the full expres-
sion of ideas, whether those ideas are condemned
by the majority or preserved by a minority. 156
2) Public Accommodation Laws and Conflicts with
the First Amendment
By recognizing Chaplinksy and R.A.V. 's First
Amendment limitations, one could question the
applicability of public accommodation laws, like
Title II of the Civil Rights Act, in community fo-
rums. Specifically, can the government use these
151 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
152 Id. at 380-81 (quoting In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464
N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991) (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at
572).
153 Id. at 386-391.
154 Id. at 393-94 ("Rather, it has proscribed fighting
words of whatever manner that communicate messages of ra-
cial, gender, or religious intolerance. Selectivity of this sort
creates the possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the
expression of particular ideas.").
155 Id. at 392 (arguing that "the point of the First
Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed
in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of
its content").
156 Id. at 395-396.
[T]he only interest distinctively served by the content
limitation is that of displaying the city council's special
hostility towards the particular biases thus singled out.
That is precisely what the First Amendment forbids. The
politicians of St. Paul are entitled to express that hostil-
ity-but not through the means of imposing unique lim-
laws to effectively censor the expressive content of
individual citizens? Hurley v. Irish American Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston157 dealt with
this issue in the context of allowing a private St.
Patrick's Day Parade organizing committee the
right to exclude a Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual
group.' 5 In Hurley, the plaintiffs alleged that the
parade committee violated the Massachusetts pub-
lic accommodation law, which extended the defi-
nition of "equal access" to include sexual prefer-
ence. 159 While the state supreme court agreed
with the plaintiff,160 the United States Supreme
Court did not, holding that the Massachusetts
public accommodation law violated the parade
committee's rights to free expression.
1 6 1
The Court reasoned that the parade committee
was not banning gay, lesbian, and bisexual people
from participating in the parade, but banning
their use of a Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual banner.
162
The majority noted that the First Amendment al-
lows private individuals to freely "tailor their
speech, apply[ing] not only to expressions of
value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to
statements of fact the speaker would rather
avoid." 163 In other words, government laws can
neither interfere with this right, nor influence a
private party's decision to endorse or ban one's
expressive content. 64 By forcing the parade com-
mittee to alter the content of their parade, the
Court found a form of content discrimination,
which is expressly forbidden by the First Amend-
ment.1
65
itations upon speakers who (however benightedly) disa-
gree.
Id.
157 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
158 Id. at 559.
159 Id. at 571-72.
160 Id. at 563-564.
161 Id. at 559.
162 Id. at 572 ("[Tjhe disagreement goes to the admis-
sion of GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its own ban-
ner.").
163 Id. at 573.
164 See id. ("This use of the State's power violates the fun-
damental rle of protection under the First Amendment,
that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his
own message.").
165 See id. at 579. The Court argued that the state court
was indirectly influencing what type of content the parade
organizers had to promote, thus violating their speaker rights
under the First Amendment.
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II. NOAH V AOL TIME WARNER- PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION LAW AND THE
CHAT ROOM
In July 2000, plaintiff Saad Noah cancelled his
AOL Internet service account "in protest."1 66 He
allegedly complained to America Online manage-
ment, including CEO Steve Case, of several offen-
sive Internet postings in an AOL chat room de-
voted to Islamic topics. 167 After AOL allegedly
failed to remove or address these derogatory
messages, Mr. Noah decided to cancel his mem-
bership. 168
In September 2002, Noah filed a suit in Federal
District Court of the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia. 169 He alleged that AOL's failure to remove
these messages constituted, inter alia, (1) a viola-
tion of Title II of the Civil Rights Act and (2) a
breach of AOL's Terms of Service and Member-
ship Agreement by not policing and/or monitor-
ing its chat rooms for offensive remarks. °7 0 Since
the messages specifically dealt with discriminatory
remarks about Islam, Noah alleged that AOL's
failure to remove them violated his equal enjoy-
ment of a "place of public accommodation"-
AOL's chat rooms.
17 1
Judge Ellis disagreed with Noah's contentions
and dismissed his suit for failure to state a valid
claim. 172 Judge Ellis found that Noah's Title II al-
legation failed for two separate reasons.' 73 First,
AOL as an ISP was granted immunity for its mem-
bers' Internet messages under Section 230 of the
CDA.174 Quoting Section 230's statutory language
and Zeran v. America Online extensively, Judge Ellis
reasoned that AOL fulfilled Section 230's "inter-
166 Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d 532,
535 (E.D. Va. 2003).
167 Id. at 535.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 536.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 532.
173 Id. at 537.
174 Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1) (2000) and quoting
Zeran, "Thus, the 'plain language' of §230 'creates a federal
immunity to any cause of action that would make [ISPs] lia-
ble for information originating with a third-party user of the
service'" 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)).
175 Id. at 538.
176 Id. at 539. ("[A]s the Fourth Circuit made clear in
Zeran, all suits seeking to place a service provider in a pub-
lisher's role in this manner are barred under §230.").
177 Id. (discussing the four relevant statutory exemptions
to CDA immunity and concluding that Noah's civil rights
claim did not fit into any of them).
active computer service provider" requirement
and did not have any role in producing the offen-
sive postings in question. 75 Since Noah's Title II
claim treated AOL as a publisher, the court dis-
missed his suit because the CDA specifically ex-
empted ISPs from publisher liability for the third
party postings in AOL's chat rooms.
176
In addition, the opinion stated that the CDA
applied to Federal Civil Rights claims and did not
come under Section 230's four exceptions.' 7 7 Al-
though the hate speech in question did not con-
tribute to the "diversity of political discourse,"'17
Judge Ellis noted that Section 230 balanced out
Congress's concerns for protecting a citizen's
freedom of speech with the expense and poten-
tially devastating effect liability would impose on
the Internet's development.17 9 Therefore, the
CDA shielded AOL from responsibility for the
third party content of their chat rooms.'8 0
Besides the CDA, Judge Ellis stated that Noah's
suit failed because chat rooms are not "places of
public accommodation" within the meaning of Ti-
tle 11.181 He noted that Title II's plain language
and the majority of case law held that a "place of
public accommodation" be physical in nature.1'
8 2
Although some federal circuits ruled that a "place
of public accommodation" could be non-physi-
cal,'8 3 Judge Ellis felt that this applied only to
ADA cases, not Title II.184 He also relied on a simi-
lar ADA case, Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines,
Co., which ruled that an Internet website was not a
"place of public accommodation" because of its
non-physical characteristics.' 8 5 Without a physical
component, the Judge found that chat rooms do
178 Id. at 540 (quoting §230(a)(3) of the CDA).
179 Id. ("Nonetheless, §230 reflects Congress's judgment
that imposing liability on [ISPs] for the harmful speech of
others would likely do more harm than good, by exposing
[them] to unmanageable liability and potentially leading to




182 Id. at 540-45 (citing Welsh, Clegg, Parker, Ford v. Scher-
ing-Plough Corp, 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998), and Access
Now).
183 Id. at 543 (noting how the First Circuit in Carparts
and the Seventh Circuit in Mutual of Omaha found no
mandatory requirement for a physical "place of public ac-
commodation").
184 Id. at 543, n.9; see also discussion of the Title II/ADA
analogy infra Part III.A.2.
185 Id. at 544; see supra notes 69-74 and discussion of the
Access Nour, see also Hudson, supra note 16.
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not fit into Title II's definition of a "place of exhi-
bition or entertainment." 186
Lastly, Judge Ellis dismissed Noah's breach of
contract claim. 18 7 By carefully analyzing the lan-
guage of the ISP's Terms of Service ("TOS"), he
noted that AOL only promised to enforce viola-
tions "at its sole discretion."' 88 The TOS also dis-
claimed the ISP from the failure to remove inap-
propriate content. 189 Having addressed and dis-
missed all of the plaintiffs issues, Judge Ellis
threw out Mr. Noah's suit. 190
III. ANALYZING NOAH: HOW TITLE II
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION LAW, THE
CDA, AND FIRST AMENDMENT
PRINCIPLES ALL LEAD TO NO
LIABILITY
Noah v. AOL Time Warner focuses on a simple,
yet unresolved issue: how the courts should clas-
sify Internet forums. 19 1 Proponents and oppo-
nents of Title II inclusion present compelling ar-
guments: from the need to preserve important
and necessary anti-discrimination laws,' 92 to not
hampering the development and viability of an in-
creasingly important communications medium. 19 3
Resolving this debate rests largely on how one ul-
timately views the Internet, and by extension, chat
rooms. Does it represent a convenient substitute
186 Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 544-45.
187 Id. at 545. ("Plaintiff's breach of contract claim must
likewise be dismissed because the contractual rights plaintiff
claims are simply not provided for in AOL's Member Agree-
ment.").
188 Id.
189 Id. ("The Membership Agreement states that while
AOL 'reserve[s] the right to remove content that, in AOL's
judgment, does not meet its standards or does not comply
with AOL's current Community Guidelines . . .AOL is not
responsible for any failure or delay in removing such mate-
rial."').
196 Id. at 546.
191 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 334 (4th
Cir. 1997) (noting the dilemma Congress faced in balancing
out free speech concerns while still enforcing federal/state
laws when passing the CDA).
192 See Tara Thomson, Comment, Locating Discrimination:
Interactive Web Sites as Public Accommodations Under Title II of the
Civil Rights Act, 2002 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 409 (2002) (arguing
that chat rooms are "places of public accommodation" under
Title II and that the law would be subverted if not extended
to the Internet).
193 See 47 U.S.C. §230(a) (3) (2000) (discussing the
CDA's purpose in preserving the Internet's free expression).
194 See Thomson, supra note 192, at 436-40 (finding that
the Internet's infrastructure equipment (servers) constitute
actual facilities).
to a physical location 194 or a separate sphere alto-
gether?
1 5
This Note argues for the latter and emphasizes
how traditional federal laws, such as Title II, do
not apply to this electronic medium. Doing oth-
erwise ignores some of the vital elements needed
for a valid Title II claim: a "physical" facility1 96 and
a "discriminatory intent."'1 97 Congress may have
intended a broad interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act, 198 but applying it to cyberspace goes
too far by contradicting the subsequent case law's
strict adherence to the "physical" world. 199 More
significant than Title II's language, chat rooms
also escape federal content oversight because of
the government's traditional protection of the In-
ternet's development and the possible conflict
with the First Amendment. Forcing ISPs to cen-
sor discriminatory messages goes against the goals
behind the CDA200 and interferes with the chat
room's growing importance as an avenue of pub-
lic discussion.
2 01
A. Chat Rooms Are Not "Places of Public
Accommodation" under Title II
1) Let's Get Physical! Title II's Main Requirement of
an Actual Facility
The Internet, by its basic definition, does not
195 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 334 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 850 (1997) ("[I]t is 'a unique and wholly new me-
dium of worldwide communication."'); see also Noah, 261 F.
Supp.2d at 544 ("[A] chat room does not exist in a particular
physical location, indeed it can be accessed almost any-
where.")).
196 See discussion of Welsh, Clegg, Access Now, and Noah
and their holdings for a "physical" place of public accommo-
dation supra Part I.A.1.
197 See infra notes 278-84 and accompanying text, which
discusses Akiyama and Boyle's "discriminatory intent" re-
quirement for a valid Title II claim.
198 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text that
summarizes Daniel v. Paul's broad interpretation of a "place
of entertainment."
199 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 544 ("In sum, whether
one relies on the Title II case law or looks to the broader
ADA definition of public place of accommodation, it is clear
that the logic of the statute and the weight of authority indi-
cate that "places of entertainment" must be actual physical
facilities.").
200 See discussion supra Part I.B.2 (describing Zeran, Doe
v. Am. Online, and Noah and their opinions describing Con-
gress's intent in passing the CDA).
201 See discussion infra Part III.C (arguing that chat
rooms help promote the expansion of public ideas and view-
points).
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have a designated physical location, but instead
exists on the computers and telephone networks
of the world's communications backbone.
202
Equating it as a "place" appears to confine its very
essence, since the Internet, unlike physical struc-
tures, can expand indefinitely, unburdened by
any geographical barriers. 2113 Thus, Judge Ellis was
correct in ruling that Internet chat rooms fail Ti-
tle II's primary requirement of either being an ac-
tual facility or at least connected to one.20 4 It is
hard to imagine that Congress intended Title II to
cover existential "places" like the Internet, a com-
munity made up of light waves and electronic im-
pulses.
20 5
Examining the statute itself proves that Title II
clearly applies solely to physical locations. 20 6 As
Noah points out, the statute primarily refers to, or
gives examples of, actual facilities in its four cate-
gories: lodging establishments, eateries, physical
entertainment venues, or establishments physi-
cally located within a "covered establishment.
'" 20 7
Of course, one can postulate that Title II should
not be read so literally and that chat rooms could
serve as "quasi-physical" locations in cyber-
space.20 8 They are, after all, chat rooms. But sev-
eral circuits already rejected a non-physical defini-
tion for "places of public accommodation," argu-
ing like Judge Ellis that "Congress intended [Title
II] to reach only the listed facilities and other sim-
ilar physical structures. '" 20 9 Both Welsh and Clegg
202 See generally Reno, 521 U.S. at 849-853 (providing a
brief overview and history of the Internet's development).
203 See id.
204 Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d 532,
542-43 (2003) (citing Welsh and Clegg).
205 See Hudson, supra note 16.
206 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §2000a (2000); Welsh v. Boy
Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1993); Clegg
v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
207 Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 54142 (listing the examples
given in §2000a, all of which are actual not "virtual" facilities).
208 See Thomson, supra note 192 at 43940 (arguing that
chat rooms have elements of "placeness" because of the In-
ternet's physical servers and networks).
209 Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 542 (citing Daniel, Welsh, and
Clegg).
210 See discussion of Welsh supra notes 41-44 (holding that
membership organizations not connected to physical facili-
ties failed Title II's statutory requirement).
211 See supra notes 49-52, discussing Clegg's holding which
followed Welsh's reasoning of a mandatory physical facility re-
quirement.
212 See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1270 ("We refuse to read into
the statute what Congress has declined to include."); See also
Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir.
declined to extend Title II to two non-physical
membership organizations: the Boys Scouts
2"'
and Cult Awareness Group. 21 1 Without the con-
nection to a specific physical facility, the Welsh
and Clegg courts reasoned that it would usurp
Congress's legislative powers by independently
reading Title II so broadlyY' 2 Federalism con-
cerns between the judiciary and legislative
branches also mandate a cautionary approach
before courts attempt to read a statute beyond its
"plain meaning."213
These attempts at restraint appear to contradict
the Supreme Court's broad reading of Title II in
both Daniel v. Paul and Miller v. Amusement Enter-
prises.2 14 After all, amusement parks2 15 and recrea-
tional parks2 1 6 were not listed as examples in Title
II's statutory language. But as Welsh and Noah
point out, these broad readings only applied to
"facilities" that were already "physical."2 1 7 Indeed,
while the term "entertainment" can certainly be
seen as "ambiguous,"2 1 8 the term "physical" seems
straightforward. 2 19 For this reason, Welsh and Clegg
could not justify labeling a non-physical member-
ship club as a "place of public accommodation"
when these groups' main purposes had nothing
to do with an actual "place."
220
Therefore, if Welsh and Clegg would not extend
Title II to non-physical membership clubs, it
stands to reason that a link cannot be made to a
non-physical Internet service like AOL's chat
1994).
213 See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1271 ("Certainly, federal judges
must not reach out and grasp at straws in an attempt to re-
write the laws duly enacted by the legislative branch of gov-
ernment, the Congress."). See also Access Now Inc. v. South-
west Airlines Co., 227 F. Supp.2d 1312, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
("... [C]ourts must follow the law as written and wait for
Congress to adopt or revise legislatively.").
214 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Daniel v. Paul and the need for effective enforcement
against segregation and racism).
215 See Miller v. Amusement Enterprises Inc, 394 F.2d
342 (5th Cir. 1968).
216 See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1969).
217 See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1270; see also Noah v. AOL Time
Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d 532, 542 (2003).
218 See Daniel, 393 U.S. at 307-08 (arguing that Congres-
sional intent implied a broad reading of the term "entertain-
ment" which did not restrict an understanding to the statti-
tory language).
219 See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1269 (arguing that "the clear
language of the statute mandates a different conclusion"
from the plaintiff).
220 Id. at 1272; Clegg, 18 F.3d at 756 (highlighting the
cautionary approach courts should take before interpreting
beyond Congress's "plain meaning").
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rooms. 2 2 1 Both groups share similar traits in that
they are not connected to a particular physical lo-
cation. 222 Instead, they serve the primary purpose
of bringing people together as a group rather
than under an actual facility.2 23 Unlike the Boy
Scouts, the Cult Awareness Group, or Daniel's rec-
reational park, AOL's chat room participants have
no physical interaction with each other and do not
meet in any actual facilities-like private homes or
community centers. 224 Thus, Judge Ellis reasona-
bly inferred that AOL's chat rooms were outside
Title II's scope in regulating physical "places of
public accommodation."
225
Proponents of Title II inclusion argue that chat
rooms do in fact fulfill the physicality require-
ment.226 They reason that chat rooms are in fact
connected to actual facilities, since physical servers
and computer networks make up the Internet.
2 27
While this argument looks promising, recent In-
ternet court decisions appear to hold the oppo-
site. 228 For example, Judge Ellis notes that Torres
v. AT&T Broadband LLC229 rejected the notion
that an on-screen cable guide was a "place of pub-
lic accommodation" simply because of its digital
cable transmission equipment.23 ° Since "in no way
does viewing the system's images require the
plaintiff to gain access to any actual physical pub-
221 Contra Thomson, supra note 192, at 436-42 (arguing
that Carparts and Doe v. Mutual of Omaha allow chat rooms to
be considered "places of public accommodation" despite lack
of physicality).
222 See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing Welsh and Clegg); see
also Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 534 (reviewing the attributes of
the Boy Scouts in the context of "places of public accommo-
dation").
223 Compare membership clubs in Welsh and Clegg, supra
Part 1.A.1, with AOL chat room in Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at
534.
224 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 534-35 (summarizing the
composition of chat rooms).
225 Id. at 540-41. Given the legal precedent and
§2000(a)'s "plain meaning," a forum (chat room) not con-
nected to an actual facility does not satisfy the elements of
Title II.
226 See Thomson, supra note 192, at 43540 (discussing
the legal scholarship of DavidJohnson and David Post, which
equated the Internet medium with traditional forms of physi-
cal space for jurisdictional purposes).
227 Id. at 438-40 (arguing that the Internet's servers and
networks meet Wesh's requirement of physical facilities).
228 See, e.g., Access Now Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.,
228 F. Supp.2d 1312, 1319-1322 (S.D.FI. 2002).
229 158 F. Supp.2d 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
230 Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 544 (quoting Torres, 158 F.
Supp.2d at 1037-38).
231 Torres, 158 F. Supp.2d at 1038 (holding that the plain-
tiff's use of a digital cable box did not require him to access
lic place," Torres reasoned that the equipment was
not akin to a "place of public accommodation."
231
Access Now v. Southwest Airlines reached a similar
conclusion in refusing to equate a website or any
other "virtual" place as a physical facility.
232
More importantly, this "server theory" appears
to fail because servers, or any computer con-
nected to them, are not necessarily accessible to
the public.233 Indeed, AOL customers cannot
physically access the company's servers at all.
These facilities represent proprietary equipment
only accessible to AOL employees, not AOL cus-
tomers. In fact, thousands of private computers
and network servers make up Internet. There-
fore, if the facilities being linked (individual com-
puters and servers) are not open to the public, they
cannot be "places of public accommodation.
2 3 4
Finally, applying the server theory to Title II
public accommodation law may have some im-
practical and potentially burdensome conse-
quences to the growing use of interactive elec-
tronic connectivity devices. So much of today's
new communications technology, from text mes-
saging services via Personal Digital Assistants
("PDAs") to the Video-on-Demand feature of digi-
tal cable companies, utilize virtual networks simi-
lar to Internet chat rooms.2- 5 If one applied the
the cable company's actual network transmission facilities).
232 See Access Now, 228 F. Supp.2d at 1318 (ruling that the
blind plaintiff did not access a physical ticket counter when
accessing the airline's website).
233 See Torres, 158 F. Supp.2d at 1037-38 (holding that
since the plaintiff used his online cable guide from his per-
sonal television, he did not have access to a "place of public
entertainment").
234 See id. Torres and Noah are similar in that an ISP cus-
tomer only has to use a modem to access AOL's chat rooms;
the customer does not access AOL's brick and mortar facili-
ties/datacenters (containing the ISP's network servers). See
id.
235 All of these services depend on "Internet-like" net-
work structures to utilize their features. For example, PDA's
use Wi-Fi wireless technology to access ISP message servers to
download their customer's e-mails. See Palm One, Wireless E-
mail Access, at http://www.palmone.com/us/wireless/web
browser.html. Video on Demand customers use their digital
cable boxes to contact the cable company's server to
download and watch their chosen movie. See Motorola Broad-
band Network Infrastructure Solutions, at http://broadband.
motorola.com/nis/video-on-demand.html. X-Box video
game hardware owners can sign up for an interactive gaming
service called X-Box Live, which allows customers to play
games and access chat rooms via a broadband internet con-
nection from their X-Box equipment. See About X-Box Live,
at http://www.xbox.com/en-US/live/about/Features-Intro
ToXboxLive.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
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server theory, a consumer's TiVO on-screen televi-
sion guide, Blackberry e-mail account, or X-Box's
online interactive video game service may all be
considered "place[s] of public accommoda-
tion."2 36 Although the Torres holding seems to
suggest otherwise (the services' physical servers
are not open to the public), applying the server
theory to the modern marketplace has broad im-
plications and places in doubt the argument that
Congress really intended Title II's provisions to
extend beyond the physical world.
2 37
2) Carparts and Doe v. Mutual of Omaha: A Shaky
Title H Comparison
By citing similar decisions under the ADA's Ti-
dle III public accommodation statute, Noah
claimed that Title II did not necessarily require a
physical component. 238 But can one really use
these ADA case holdings in arguing Title II
cases?239 As Judge Ellis indicated, the basis of Mr.
Noah's broad interpretation theory rested on the
ADA's Title III statutory language, not on Title
11.240 Thus, he noted, it may be inappropriate to
analogize the ambiguities, as "the Civil Rights Act
does not include a 'travel service,' 'insurance of-
fice,' or 'other service establishments' in its defini-
tion."241 To Ellis, Title II may therefore have a
more solid physicality requirement than the
236 Cf Thomson, supra note 192 at 43540. Applying the
server theory, one could analogize TIVO's online TV sched-
ule database or the Blackberry user's e-mail servers as physical
facilities. See TiVO, at http://www.tivo.com/1.3.1.asp (last
visited Feb. 10, 2004) (describing TIVO's dial-up service,
which updates the unit's scheduling function), and Black-
berry Wireless, at http://www.blackberry.com/products/ser
vice/email.shtml (last visited Feb. 10, 2004) (explaining the
Blackberry mobile e-mail service).
237 See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text, which
discusses the Tor-es decision and how utilizing one's digital
cable box did not require access to the company's transmis-
sion facilities.
238 Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 543.
239 But see Thomson, supra note 192 at 428-430 (arguing
that one may analogize ADA case law with Title II cases).
240 Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 543 n.9 (noting how Carparts
relies strictly on the ADA language, which is different from
Title II's).
241 Id.
242 See id. at 543 ("Thus, it appears that the weight of au-
thority endorses the 'actual physical structure' requirement
in the ADA context as well.").
243 See 42 U.S.C. §12187(7) (2000); see also discussion of
the category differences between ADA and Title II supra
notes 56-57.
244 Compare the "social evils" being protected in Daniel v.
Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969), with Carparts Distribution
ADA.2 4 2
In addition, the ADA has a much more exten-
sive list of categories than Title II, implying a
broader intent compared with the Civil Rights
Act. 243 While certainly similar in nature, combat-
ing discrimination against disabled people em-
phasizes different goals and problems than dis-
crimination against a cultural group. 244 For exam-
ple, disabled people often face physical accessibil-
ity issues (e.g., no adequate ramps) 2 45 that an eth-
nic group, like Asian Americans, rarely deals with.
It may be for this reason that Congress created a
more extensive list of categories in the ADA, since
the two statutes' discrimination history developed
differently.
24 6
Doubt also remains as to whether courts that ac-
cept the Carparts and Doe v. Mutual of Omaha ADA
holdings would use the same broad interpretation
in Title II cases.24 7 The Seventh Circuit decided
both the Welsh and later Doe v. Mutual of Omaha
appellate court cases;2 48 yet, Mutual of Omaha does
not mention Welsh in its opinion. 249 If the Seventh
Circuit truly believed in a broad public accommo-
dation theory for both Title II and the ADA, why
did it not overrule Welsh's "physical" requirement
when deciding Mutual of Omaha? This suggests
that the two laws are not necessarily analogous
and should be interpreted using different stan-
dards.2 50 Even a cursory look at the totality of
Ctr. Inc. v. Auto. Wholesalers Ass'n. of New England Inc., 37
F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994).
245 See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198
F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the "access" com-
ponent of Title III and providing examples of a proper ADA
suit (e.g., wheelchair ramp and elevator accessibility issues)).
246 Compare Justice Brennan's discussion of congressional
Title II intent in Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307 ("[T]o move the daily
affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of
access to [public] facilities...") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 88-
914, at 18 (1964)), with the ADA as discussed in Carparts, 37
F.3d at 19 ("[T]o bring individuals with disabilities into the
economic and social mainstream of American life .... )
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 101485, at 99 (1991)). This by itself
reflects a more extensive policy aim with the ADA.
247 Most courts interpreting the ADA reject Carpart's ex-
tensive "place of public accommodation" holding. See, e.g.,
Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., 227 F. Supp.2d
1312, 1318 (S.D.Fla. 2002).
248 Welsh was decided on May 17, 1993, while Mutual of
Omaha was decided on June 2, 1999. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts
of Am., 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993); Doe v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
249 See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir.
1999).
250 See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d
532, 543 n.9 (2003).
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ADA public accommodation cases reveals a split
in deciding the necessity of the physicality compo-
nent.
25 1
3) Chat Rooms: Social Group or "Place of
Entertainment?"
Besides the physicality element, chat rooms
could also fail the "place of public accommoda-
tion" designation due to the online forum's mis-
application as a "place of exhibition or entertain-
ment."2 52 Though courts tend to view "entertain-
ment" broadly, this does not necessarily mean that
a chat room serves a "recreational" function. 253 In
fact, one could argue that chat rooms more likely
resemble a social membership club, similar to the
Boy Scouts in Welsh, thus falling out of Title II's
"place of entertainment" category.254
Welsh noted that by passing Title II, Congress
did not intend to regulate "a wide spectrum of
consensual human relationships. '"2 5 5 Membership
clubs, like the Boys Scouts, can certainly provide
many "recreational" activities.2 56 However, the
Scouts still did not fall under Tide II's jurisdiction
because they did not function "as a 'ticket' to ad-
mission to a [physical] facility or location."
257
Thus, the focus of these excepted groups was "in-
teraction" with people rather than access to en-
tertainment.2 5
8
Like the Boy Scouts, a court could view chat
251 Id. at 543-44 (highlighting the ADA circuit split over
the physicality issue).
252 See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1269-70. Cf Thomson, supra
note 192, at 442-445 (arguing that chat rooms are "places of
entertainment" with the presence of stylized scripts, icons,
and proximity to online gaming options).
253 Id.; see also Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 305-08 (1969)
(holding that a lakeside club offered "recreational activities"
with access to a snack bar and swimming/boating facilities).
254 See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1269-76. But see Thomson,
supra note 192, at 443-44 (arguing that chat rooms fall out of
the "social relationship" distinction by being analogized to
"coffee houses," "dance clubs," and other areas of social in-
teraction).
255 See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1270.
256 Id. at 1269. Plaintiff in Welsh claimed the Boy Scouts
'"offer[ed] entertainment to the public at various locations,
all of which are 'places.'" Id.
257 Id. at 1272.
258 See id. at 1275 ("While it is true that 'people' and not
'places' are the source of discrimination, in Title II Congress
focused exclusively on prohibiting discrimination in places of
public accommodation and not in every conceivable social rela-
tionship.").
259 See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d
532, 534-35 (2003) (describing chat rooms in general, in par-
ticular AOL's Muslim chat rooms).
rooms as more of a discussion group, especially in
the rooms focusing on particular topics like Is-
lamic culture. 25 9 The primary purpose of these
chat rooms centers on "cultural enrichment" and
gathering people of similar backgrounds rather
than acting as a physical location offering recrea-
tional activities. 260 Some members might even
consider themselves part of a family or even a sup-
port network like Alcoholics Anonymous, distinc-
tions far removed from a "place of entertain-
ment."261 Defined in this manner, chat rooms
could fulfill Welsh's membership club exemption,
thus freeing them from Title II regulation.
262
Still, some critics could point to chat rooms'
close connection to other online entertainment
products, thus coloring them as a "place of en-
tertainment. '" 2 6 3 United States. v. Baird already
holds that a facility containing even a small
amount of recreational activities makes them a
"place of entertainment."264 However, Baird fo-
cused on a video game already within a 7-Eleven
store's premises.26 5 Since most chat rooms are lo-
cated in a segregated section of the website, the
peripheral "entertainment" products might not
matter.266 As demonstrated in Halton v. Great
Clips, a non-entertainment facility (i.e., a hair sa-
lon) does not necessarily fall under Title II even
though it was located in a shopping center with
some "recreational" or "covered" facilities (i.e.,
restaurants in Halton's case) .267
260 Compare the function and activities of the AOL chat
room in Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 534-35 with the Lakeside
recreational park in Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 305-08
(1969), which offered a lakeside snack bar as well as boating
and swimming facilities.
261 See id.
262 See Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1278 ("Man is a human being
who has a sociological need to join with others in order to
develop his full being and to fulfill his need for companion-
ship as well as enjoyment. Congress, in drafting Title II cer-
tainly did not intend to interfere with the development of the
whole man.").
263 See discussion of United States v. Baird supra notes 84-
88; see also Thomson, supra note 192, at 444 (arguing that
chat rooms could better fit the "entertainment" description if
chat rooms combined online gaming and other recreational
options within their service platform).
264 85 F.3d 450, 454 (9th Cir. 1996).
265 See id. at 453-54.
266 See Halton v. Great Clips Inc., 94 F. Supp.2d 856, 863
(N.D. Ohio 2000). A chat room could be seen as a "separate
store" of the ISP like Halton's hair salon within a shopping
center containing Title II covered establishments.
267 Id. (finding that Title II's catch-all provision
(§2000a(b) (4)) did not apply since the hair salon did not
have "exclusive control" over the makeup of the shopping
center's tenants).
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Nevertheless, courts might not find chat rooms
analogous to the Great Clips hair salon because
Halton's defendant had no control over the activi-
ties or tenants of the shopping center.2 68 On the
other hand, large ISPs like AOL often own and
control both the chat room as well as other "en-
tertainment" products. 2Y16 Fortunately, Title II still
requires proximity or some connection to a physi-
cal "place of exhibition or entertainment," so In-
ternet chat rooms still fail the statute's defini-
tion.
270
B. An Inherent Immunity: How Chat Room
Accessibility and the CDA's Provisions Help
Prevent Title II Applicability
Besides the "[physical] place of public accom-
modation" distinction, Title II may not apply to
chat rooms because of the Internet's "democratic"
nature 27 I and its traditional protection by the gov-
ernment. 272 One of the primary reasons behind
the enactment of Title II was to ensure equal ac-
cess to people of all races and beliefs.2 73 Thus, Ti-
tle II may not necessarily apply to chat rooms be-
cause they are largely open to anyone with Internet
access. 274 In addition, Zeran and Noah point to
protective government laws like the CDA, which
grant ISPs significant immunity from traditional
forms of federal regulation (e.g., Title II).275
Thus, the law has the potential to preempt a Civil




269 See description of AOL's Membership Features, at
http://www.corp.aol.com/whoweare/ (summarizing all of
AOL's offerings and services) (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
270 See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the "physical" facility
requirement of Title II).
271 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851-52 (1997)
(describing the overall composition of the Internet and the
explosion of communications mediums and public expres-
sion it has spawned).
272 See supra notes 104-113 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the history of the CDA's passage and the policy be-
hind granting ISPs "publisher" immunity).
273 See United States v. Baird, 85 F.3d 450, 454-55 (9th
Cir. 1996) (describing how Title II was meant to cure the
"great evil" of denying African Americans, Jews, and Native
Americans access to public areas because of their race).
274 See Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d
532, 534 (E.D.Va. 2003) (discussing how one can participate
in an AOL chat room).
275 See supra notes 126-134 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the broad "publisher" immunity the CDA grants
ISPs).
276 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 539.
1) How the Chat Room's Open Nature Provides
"Equal Access" To Everyone
"Discriminatory intent" represents one of the
most crucial elements of a successful Title II
suit.2 77 In Akiyama v. U.S.Judo Inc.,27 1 a federal dis-
trict court in Washington dismissed the plaintiffs
Title II case because he could not prove that a
judo club's bowing requirement constituted delib-
erate religious discrimination. 279 The court rea-
soned that Title II's language required an "inten-
tional" act of discrimination and that failure to ac-
commodate a person's religious beliefs completely
did not rise to that level. 2 0 Boyle v. Jerome Country
Club281 reached a similar holding, finding that a
golf club's decision to hold a tournament on Sun-
day did not discriminate against the plaintiffs
Mormon religion.28 2 Since the defendant had a
valid non-discriminatory reason for the decision-
financial constraints, the plaintiff failed to estab-
lish the necessary "discriminatory intent.
'" 2 3
Taking this into account, the case for Title II
application to chat rooms appears weak. After all,
admission into most chat rooms does not require
the disclosure of racial or religious affiliation, with
most only asking users to choose a user identifica-
tion and password. 284 While some registration
forms may require additional information, a per-
son's religious beliefs or race rarely causes an ISP
to deny them access to a chat room.28 5 In fact,
most ISP services like AOL encourage their In-
ternet users to behave responsibly and avoid any
277 See Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., F. Supp.2d 1179 (W.D.
Wash. 2002); see also Boyle v. Jerome Country Club, 883 F.
Supp. 1422 (D. Idaho 1995). The two cases involve Title II
suits brought under religious discrimination grounds similar
to Mr. Noah's complaint. Id.
278 181 F. Supp.2d 1179 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
279 Id. at 1186-87. The plaintiff claimed that the judo
club's requirement for him to bow at inanimate objects
before tournament matches discriminated against his relig-
ious beliefs. Id.
280 Id. at 1185-86 (discussing how in both "disparate im-
pact" and "disparate treatment" Title II cases, the plaintiff
must prove a deliberate "discriminatory intent" by the defen-
dant).
281 883 F. Supp. 1422 (D. Idaho 1995).
282 Id. at 1432 (finding that enough proof did not exist
establishing that the club's decision stemmed from discrimi-
nation against Mormons).
283 Id. at 1431.
284 See Thomson, supra note 192, at 441 (describing the
process of signing up for an AOL, Yahoo, and MSN IDs).
285 See AOL registration website, at http://my.screen
name.aol.com (requiring only a user name, password, birth-
day, and e-mail address. There is no mandatory requirement
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language or behavior that may disparage a per-
son's particular race or faith. 2 6 Thus, the rela-
tively open membership process and lack of any re-
ligious or racial profiling suggests that ISPs could
not easily develop a "discriminatory" intent to
deny admission into their Internet forums.
28 7 If
access represents a primary component of a Tide
II suit, the non-selectivity of chat room admission
seems to disprove the element of a "discrimina-
tory intent."
2 8
2) The CDA: Consistently Seen by Courts as a
Barrier to Third Party ISP Liability
More significant than a chat room's open na-
ture or even Title II itself, the CDA presents a for-
midable barrier to holding ISPs liable for the
hateful postings of its members. 28 9 As Judge Ellis
points out in Noah, the few legal cases dealing
with the issue have all reached similar conclusions
in finding no third party liability.2 90 A careful
analysis of Section 230's language reveals a delib-
erate attempt at shielding ISPs from government
enforced monitoring systems to censor potentially
defamatory messages. 291 Therefore, it does not
make sense for courts to impose Tide II on chat
room messages since this essentially requires ISPs
to perform a censoring duty that Congress specifi-
cally exempted.
292
Critics, like Justice Lewis in Doe v. America On-
for the disclosure of racial or religious information.) (last vis-
ited Feb. 10, 2004).
286 See AOL Member Agreement, at http://legal.web.aol.
com/aol/aolpol/memagree.html, and the AOL Rules of
Member Conduct at http://www.aol.com/copyright/rules.
html. (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
287 Compare Title II's "discriminatory intent" require-
ment supra notes 277-83 and AOL's actions in Noah v. AOL
Time Warner, 261 F. Supp.2d 532, 534-36 (E.D. Va. 2003).
No evidence presented in Noah firmly established that AOL
denied Mr. Noah access to their chat rooms because of the
plaintiff's religion. In fact, Mr. Noah terminated his account
on his own accord. Id. at 535.
288 See Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., 181 F. Supp.2d 1179, at
1185-87; see also Boyle, 883 F. Supp. at 1431-32; Noah, 261 F.
Supp. at 534-36. Since chat rooms rarely ask for religious af-
filiation, there are a number of more probable non-discrimi-
natory reasons for failing to monitor message content.
289 See 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1) (2000) (providing ISPs
broad "publisher" immunity from third party content in In-
ternet postings).
290 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 538-39 (describing the
holdings of Zeran v. Am. Online, Green v. Am. Online, Blumen-
thal v. Drudge, and Ben Ezra Weinstein & Co v. Am. Online Inc).
291 See Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31
line, point to the publisher/distributor liability
tort distinction 293 and believe that ISPs have an
implied responsibility to screen out libelous
messages in which they have notice.29 4 This situa-
tion fits into Mr. Noah's case, as he sent several e-
mails complaining about the chat room's discrim-
inatory messages to AOL management. 295 Unfor-
tunately, it also highlights a rather obvious incon-
sistency: would Congress pass a law giving ISPs
"publisher" liability yet require responsibility indi-
rectly through "distributor" liability?
296
This reasoning seems to contradict the CDA's
intent of removing barriers to the Internet's
growth and development.29 7 As Zeran notes, the
potentially burdensome requirement of monitor-
ing thousands of messages a day was a central
finding behind the CDA's passage. 29 8 ISPs would
probably face financial ruin or as Noah points out,
shut down their chat rooms before they accept lia-
bility as distributors. 29 9 Therefore, Zeran repre-
sents the better CDA interpretation as it preserves
the law's spirit in shielding ISPs from liability con-
cerns of third party actions in which they had no
involvement.
3 0 0
In fact, the potential for burdening the In-
ternet's development could demonstrate a lack of
"discriminatory intent" when ISPs fail to censor
discriminatory chat room messages.3 0' AOL's lack
of monitoring and alleged unwillingness to re-
move the messages could have nothing to do with
(4th Cir. 1997) (discussing the CDA's statutory language).
292 See id. Requiring the monitoring of messages for in-
stances of racial discrimination seems similar to Zeran's anal-
ogy of "editing" one's product as a publisher. See id.
293 Doe v. Am. Online Inc., 783 So.2d 1010, 1019-25 (Fla.
2001) (Lewis, J. dissenting) (highlighting the absence of a
Congressional grant of "distributor" immunity within the
CDA's language).
294 Id.
295 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 535.
296 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331-34 (holding that §230's lan-
guage treats publishers and distributors equally when grant-
ing ISPs defamation immunity).
297 See 47 U.S.C. §230(b) (2) (2000).
298 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (describing the problems
ISPs could face if forced to monitor all their members'
messages).
299 See Noah, 261 F. Supp. at 540.
300 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (arguing that the plaintiff
could not equate AOL as a distributor without first finding it
as a publisher - either way, the CDA grants ISPs immunity
from both).
so See Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., 181 F. Supp.2d 1179,
1185-87 (W.D.Wa. 2002); see also Boyle v. Jerome Country
Club, 883 F. Supp. 1422, 1431-32 (D.Idaho 1995).
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Mr. Noah's religious beliefs. 30 2 The cost in effec-
tively removing all potentially harmful messages
from chat rooms could be significant, 3° 3 since
Zeran points out that members post hundreds of
messages every hour.30 4 With the current technol-
ogy, an ISP could not possibly filter out every-
thing 11 5 Their current difficulty in curbing e-mail
spam only emphasizes the point.30 6 Therefore,
the CDA's rationale could be analogous to Boyle's
Sunday golf tournament in that AOL and ISPs
have a legitimate non-discriminatory reason (i.e.,
financial constraints) 30 7 for having an un-
monitored chat room.30
8
C. Title II, Chat Rooms, and the First
Amendment: A Conflict in Authority?
Even if courts concluded that Title II's "place of
public accommodation" language included chat
rooms, the First Amendment would remain a final
hurdle to suits like Mr. Noah's. 30 9 Since chat
rooms provide a convenient forum for public dis-
cussion, the question remains as to whether the
federal government has the authority to force
ISPs to censor their members' messages. 310 After
all, one could view the Internet as the "new Amer-
ican street corner"311 where people can freely ex-
302 See Akiyama, 181 F. Supp.2d at 1185-87; see also Boyle,
883 F. Supp. at 1431-32. Because of their open chat room
admission process, AOL had no specific or immediate knowl-
edge of Mr. Noah's religious faith. See Noah, 261 F. Supp. at
535-36.
303 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (highlighting the daunting




306 See Saul Hansell, The Bandwagon To Fight Spam Hits a
Bump, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2003, at CI (describing the diffi-
culties that ISPs and Congress face in fighting the "nuisance"
of spam and other "unwanted e-mail advertising").
307 See Boyle, 883 F. Supp. at 1431. The failure of AOL to
effectively monitor their Islamic chat rooms more likely
stems from the "bottom line" rather than deliberate religious
discrimination.
308 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 541 (explaining Plaintiff's
contention that AOL violated Title II due to discriminatory
treatment based on his Islamic beliefs).
309 See discussion of hate speech and "fighting words"
supra Part I.C.1. (describing the boundaries the First Amend-
ment places on the federal government authority to regulate
a citizen's rights of free expression).
310 Cf47 U.S.C. §230(b) (3) (2000) (encouraging the pri-
vate development of Internet content monitoring technolo-
gies).
311 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,
press their ideas and beliefs, however enlightened
or unseemly. 3 12 Therefore if chat rooms both fa-
cilitate and encourage free expression, why
should they not enjoy the same First Amendment




1) Chat Rooms and Hate Speech: Protected or
Unprotected Free Speech ?
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court recog-
nized that not all forms of free speech are worthy
of constitutional protection from government reg-
ulation.314 One could certainly put hate speech in
this category since it neither serves a valid public
function nor enlightens the public's views.
3 15
However, the court in R.A.V. noted that some
forms of hate speech might be within a citizen's
First Amendment rights.316 Therefore, lawmakers
should be cautious when crafting statutes involv-
ing content regulation as legislators may inadver-
tently violate the Constitution in their quest to
regulate the method in which citizens express
their views.
3 17
Recognizing this principle, one could argue
that censoring hate speech within chat rooms
could be a form of impermissible content regula-
515 (1939) ("Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest,
they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and ... have been used for.., discussing public ques-
tions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens.").
312 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92
(1992). Mr. Noah's Title II claim could be analogized to the
St. Paul statute at issue in RA.V., which banned all speech
dealing with racial discrimination. See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d
at 535, 541.
313 Cf RA.V., 505 U.S. at 391-92; see also Hague, 307 U.S.
at 515. Both chat rooms and public streets comprise "arenas"
where people debate current issues.
314 See 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (discussing how fight-
ing words, "those which by their very utterance inflict injury
of tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," are not
constitutionally protected).
315 Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 540 (E.D.Va. 2003) ("To be
sure, the offensive statements plaintiff complains of are a far
cry from the 'diversity of political discourse, unique opportu-
nities for cultural development and myriad avenues for intel-
lectual activity' that §230 is intended to protect.") (citation
omitted).
316 R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 391 (discussing when "fighting
words" ordinances are not permissible).
317 See id. (concluding that speech-banning laws should




tion.318 Specifically, if the "hate speech" postings
in Noah's AOL chat rooms do not implicate an
"immediate" threat of harm, can they be validly
erased through court enforcement of Federal
Civil Rights laws?319 The messages in question cer-
tainly used threatening language to all of the chat
room's participants.3 2 But could AOL's Muslim
members reasonably consider the postings an "im-
mediate threat" to their safety?321 After all,
messages posted in chat rooms are usually anony-
mous (absent a descriptive user ID), do not indi-
cate a member's location, and can be written
from anywhere and at anytime in the world.3 22 Al-
though the postings constitute a particularly dis-
tasteful ideal (i.e., religious defamation), this does
not appear to fit into the Chaplinsky mold of un-
protected "group fighting words. ' 323 The
messages did not appear to threaten any particu-
lar person or indicate an immediate possibility of
violence because they came from an anonymous
poster who did not pose a significant threat to
one particular member.3 24 Absent this "fighting
words" exception, it would seem inappropriate to
force AOL to censor these protected forms of
speech through the Civil Rights Act.
32 5
Not all forms of chat room speech will necessa-
318 Compare St. Paul ordinance in RAV, 505 U.S. at 391
and Mr. Noah's argument that AOL should have censored
the discriminatory chat room hate speech, Noah, 261 F.
Supp.2d at 535. See generally Siegel, supra note 145 (discuss-
ing the legal history of hate speech on the Internet and how
the United States and other world governments balance out
free speech concerns).
319 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 535 (describing the offen-
sive chat room postings at issue); see also Chaplinsky, 315 U.S.
at 571-72 (discussing when the state has a legitimate state in-
terest in banning "fighting words.").
320 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 535. The messages all
made disparaging remarks about Muslim culture, practices,
and its leading theological figures. Id.
321 See id. The messages only made "general" threats
against Muslims and were not directed at any specific chat
room member.
322 Id. at 534 (describing the nature of chat rooms and
providing a technical overview). One of the more remarka-
ble features of the Internet is the ability for people to com-
municate anonymously. See generally, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S
844. at 849-853 (1997).
323 Compare Noah's chat room postings, Noah, 261 F.
Supp.2d at 535 with the discussion of appropriate "fighting
words" ordinances as laid out in Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-
72 (describing a valid State interest in curbing "immediate
threats" of violence).
324 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 534-35. Because AOL's
chat rooms allow anonymous User IDs and lack geographic
location devices, none of the board posters could determine
the exact location of the other chat room members or their
rily receive the requisite First Amendment protec-
tion.326 For example, federal or state laws may reg-
ulate certain forms of Internet harassment if they
threatened the immediate safety of a particular
group or person. 327 In addition, unprotected free
speech (e.g., posting images of child pornography)
is still not subject to any First Amendment protec-
tions, even in chat rooms. 328 Nevertheless, courts
should walk a fine line before pernitting Title II
to become a backdoor for the censorship of pro-
tected speech in chat rooms. 32
9
2) Title II Chat Room Oversight and Hurley: A
Possible Form of Government-Sponsored Content
Regulation?
One can analogize the facts in Noah to a similar
situation in Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Group of Boston.330 If the Supreme
Court did not allow a broad Massachusetts public
accommodation law to indirectly influence a pri-
vate party's speaker rights, 331 it follows that courts
cannot force an ISP to remove protected hate
speech messages via Title 11.332 Enforcing the Civil
Rights Act this way appears to turn the anti-dis-
crimination law into an unconstitutional form of
names/identities.
325 Compare Noah's chat room postings, Noah, 261 F.
Supp.2d at 535 with Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. Because
the AOL chat room postings lacked Chaplinksky-like "fighting
words," there does not appear to be a basis for sidestepping
the First Amendment.
326 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (discussing how li-
bel, obscene statements, and "fighting words" do not carry
any First Amendment protections).
327 See 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(5), (c) (1) (2000) (stating that
the CDA does not immunize against Federal anti-harassment
laws).
328 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874-75 (1997) (dis-
cussing how the First Amendment does not apply to child
pornography cases); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
764 (1982) (holding that child pornography images do not
have First Amendment protections).
329 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 337, 391-92
(1992).
330 515 U.S. 557 (1995). See also Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at
545 n. 12 (E.D. Va. 2003).
3 1 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574.
332 See id. at 572-73. The imposition of Mr. Noah's Title
II censorship duty on AOL could be analogized to the impo-
sition of the Massachusetts public accommodation law on
Hurley's St. Patrick's Day Parade Committee. See Noah, 261 F.
Supp.2d at 545 n. 12 ("Finally, construing Title 11 as plaintiff
requests, to require that AOL censor or limit the speech of its
members, may well cause the statute to run afoul of the First
Amendment.").
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content regulation.331 While Title II certainly
aimed at preventing discriminatory access to pub-
lic facilities, its purpose was not to control the ex-
pression of people's ideas.3 34 Thus, forcing ISPs
to monitor their chat rooms for potentially dis-
criminatory messages seems like an indirect form
of government-sponsored censorship.
335
This interpretation in no way destroys the effec-
tiveness of either Hurley's state law or Title 11.336
As Hurley noted, the private party could not deny
access to the participants simply because of their
sexual orientation. 337 This probably extends to
ISPs like AOL, who could not deny plaintiffs like
Mr. Noah access to their chat rooms solely based
on a member's religious faith.338 However, both
the Massachusetts law and Title II cannot serve as
a form of content regulation by forcing private
parties to "tailor" their forums into a more accept-
able message."39
Expanding this point, enforcing Title II in the
chat room environment may quash the Internet's
overall purpose, or worse, contribute to their pos-
sible demise.3 40 People would probably not ex-
press their views so freely in this electronic forum
if they knew ISPs would subsequently edit
them.34' However, monitoring chat rooms for
hate speech does not entirely depend on federal
333 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73. Literal compliance with
Title 1I's anti-discrimination provisions in this suggested
manner would require AOL to screen out potentially divisive
postings to ensure an "open access" and "content neutral"
environment.
334 See discussion of Congress's intent when passing Title
II supra Part I.A.
335 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-73; Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at
545 n. 12. By forcing AOL, via Title II, to screen out hate
speech postings in its chat rooms, the ISP would appear to
become the Federal Government's de facto "agent."
336 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572. The policies behind the
Noah and Hurley decisions do not endorse the idea of al-
lowing AOL or the Boston Committee permission to deny
Muslim/gay people access to the chat room/parade. See
Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 535-36, 540-45.
337 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572 ("Its enforcement does not
address any dispute about the participation of openly gay, les-
bian, or bisexual individuals to various units admitted to the
parade .... Instead, the disagreement goes to the admission
of GLIB unit carrying its own banner...").
338 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 535-36 (E.D. Va. 2003).
Mr. Noah never conclusively established that AOL denied
him access to their chat rooms because he was Muslim. In
fact, he terminated his account on his own accord. Id. But see
discussion infra Part III.D (posing the question as to whether
ISPs could use the "physicality" or CDA defense in bypassing
Title II's "equal access" provisions).
339 Imposing the laws by requiring censorship duties on
the defendants in Noah and Hurley would effectively control
oversight. 342 ISPs, unlike the government, can still
censor messages on their own accord since they
are not state actors.343 However, forcing them to
censor via a federal law raises a different issue al-
together, and brings into question whether courts
are interpreting Congress's intent correctly.
3.44
As stated earlier, Congress in Title II wanted "to
remove the daily affront and humiliation involved
in discriminatory denials of access to [public] fa-
cilities." 345 Reading the statute plainly does not
imply a mandate to make public facilities "content
neutral."346 Indeed, interpreting it this way would
frustrate the aims of the CDA, Hurley, and Reno by
discriminating against one form of content for an-
other.347 A better solution would be adopting the
CDA's methodology and giving ISPs room to in-
vent their own efficient solutions in solving the
problem. 3
48
D. Can Title II Ever Apply to the Internet Chat
Room Environment?
The question remains as to whether ISPs can
ever utilize Title II's "physicality" requirement, the
CDA, or the First Amendment to avoid every dis-
crimination lawsuit dealing with their chat
rooms.349 For example, could ISPs use the same
the speech content of their forums. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at
572-73.
340 See Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th
Cir. 1997) ("Thus... liability upon notice has a chilling effect
on the freedom of Internet speech."); see also Noah, 261 F.
Supp.2d at 540.
341 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
342 See Cyber Promotions Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 948 F.
Supp. 436 (E.D. Penn. 1996) (holding that private ISP did
not violate a plaintiffs free speech rights by restricting their
e-mails).
343 See id. at 445; see also Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 546 (dis-
missing Mr. Noah's First Amendment claim because AOL is a
private party).
344 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 571-72 (denying the use of state
power to interfere with "speaker's autonomy to choose the
content of his own message").
345 Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1969) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 18 (1964)).
346 See 42 U.S.C. §2000a(a) (2000).
347 See discussion of CDA, Hurley, and Reno supra Part
III.B-C (emphasizing First Amendment concerns when ratio-
nalizing their holdings).
348 See Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th
Cir. 1997) ("Another important purpose of §230 was to en-
courage [ISPs] to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive
material over their services"); see also 42 U.S.C. §2000(b) (3)
(2000).
'49 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 539 (arguing that the
CDA provides ISPs immunity from federal civil rights claims
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defenses in denying a racial/religious minority ac-
cess or admission to its chat rooms? While this
possibility seems remote due to the non-selectivity
and relative anonymity with the chat room regis-
tration process, 350 an ISP could theoretically avert
a Tide II access lawsuit simply by claiming that "vir-
tual" forums are not subject to the statute's provi-
sions.3
5'
Access Now suggests that Congress could avert
this possibility by including Internet mediums,
like chat rooms, within the statutory definition of
"places of public accommodation" in both the
ADA352 and Title .353 However, a simple amend-
ment of Title II's language will likely neither re-
solve the free speech issues addressed in RAVand
Hurley nor bypass the CDA publisher immunity in
non-access cases like Mr. Noah's.3 54 Nevertheless,
some limited situations may exist where a chat
room plaintiff could utilize the "new" Title II's
anti-discrimination provisions while still respect-
ing the CDA and the First Amendment.
For example, court interpretation of this ex-
panded Title II could limit Internet applicability
solely to cases where plaintiffs proved a discrimi-
natory denial of access.355 Instead of focusing on
over a chat room's third party postings). The court does not
address whether the CDA could be used to escape Title II
suits that address ISP behavior rather than the actions of the
ISP's individual members.
350 See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the open nature of
the chat room/Internet medium).
351 Under this theoretical suit, the defendant ISP could
argue it was not subject to Title II because Internet chat
rooms are not "physical" facilities. See discussion supra Part
III.A.1 (describing Title II's physicality requirement and the
majority of court decisions approving such an interpreta-
tion).
352 See Access Now Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 227 F.
Supp.2d 1312, 1318 (S.D.Fla. 2002) (arguing that Congress
has the sole power in revising the ADA language to include
the Internet as a "place of public accommodation").
353 Hudson, supra note 16 (quoting Robert O'Neil, Di-
rector of Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free
Expression, "A legislature could repackage places of public
accommodation to include online places if they choose.").
354 Even if Mr. Noah could link a chat room to a "public
place of accommodation," he would still have to prove that
AOL denied him equal access to the chat room and that forc-
ing AOL to censor the third party messages does not consti-
tute an unconstitutional form of content regulation. See dis-
cussion of "discriminatory intent" and the First Amendment
conflicts with content regulation supra Parts III.B, III.C.
355 See 42 U.S.C. §2000a(a) (2000) (describing Congres-
sional intent in providing "equal access" to all persons in the
"full and equal enjoyment of goods, services . . . ."); see also
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (holding that a lakeside
recreational park could not deny African-African residents of
Little Rock, Arkansas access to their facilities), and Miller v.
the chat room's third party postings or any ISP
duty to edit their content,3 56 the amended law
should only apply to cases where ISPs arbitrarily
denied a protected class admission or registra-
tion.35 7 In this regard, the CDA and the First
Amendment will likely not be an issue, as the
complaint deals with ISP discriminatory conduct
rather than chat room message content.35s By limit-
ing Tide II chat room enforcement as such, courts
will likely be able to "remove the daily affront and
humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of
access" 359 and still protect ISPs from burdensome
censorship duties.
However, even this amended Tide II example
could face additional conflicts. The present Tide
II law still grants a "private club" exception that
excludes federal liability for non-public "places of
accommodation. ' 360 The line between public and
private areas appears blurry in the Internet, as
many private webmasters depend on public ISP net-
works to maintain their website's accessibility to
the outside world. 361 Will the ISP bear the liability
burden if a private webmaster denies racial/relig-
ious minorities access to their private chat room
just because the ISP hosts their private website?
Amusement Enterprises Inc, 394 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968).
These cases dealt with a facility operator denying a Title II
protected class access to their public facilities.
356 See Noah v. AOL Time Warner, 261 F. Supp.2d 532,
535-36, 541 (E.D. Va. 2003). Although Mr. Noah claims he
received "disparate discriminatory treatment" by AOL, the
crux of his argument centers on AOL's alleged refusal to re-
move the discriminatory third party messages from the ISP's
chat rooms. See id.
357 See id. at 537. The court found AOL to be an im-
proper defendant in Mr. Noah's lawsuit because his com-
plaint made "no reference whatever ... to any acts or con-
duct by AOL Time Warner alleged to be violative of any legal
duty owed to the plaintiff." By focusing on chat room access
issues, a proper Title II claim would center on the actions
undertaken by the ISP (they largely control admission to
their forums) and not a third party. See id.
358 Cf R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992);
Zeran v. Am. Online Inc, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). In
this hypothetical, the lawsuit does not deal with R.A.V 's gov-
ernment-sponsored content regulation or any form of bulle-
tin board censorship as seen in Zeran.
-95 Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 88-
914, at 18 (1964)).
360 42 U.S.C. §2000a(e); see also Welsh v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1276 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
Boy Scouts is not a "place of public accommodation" because
it is a private organization).
361 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850-53 (1997)
(describing the makeup on the Internet, specifically its net-
work/server relationship and how customers utilize ISPs to
host their websites).
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This public/private dilemma seems remarkably
similar to the "publisher/distributor" discussion
last seen in the CDA-related case law.3 62 An ISP
could argue that they should not bear Title II re-
sponsibility over private chat rooms, since they
have no ability to control their customers' private
actions. ""-' Like the defendant in Blumenthal v.
Drudge, "64 the hypothetical ISP simply provides
web space and does not have any direct involve-
ment with the discrimination in question. 365 In-
deed, forcing ISPs to monitor private websites
would run into the same conflicts present in pub-
lic chat rooms: the CDA's ISP "publisher" immu-
nity and the First Amendment barrier to content
regulation.3 66 Of course, the hypothetical plaintiff
would still be free to sue the private website
solely.
3 6 7
In summation, an amended Title II (which in-
cluded chat rooms) would still need to consider
the broader implications of expanding applicabil-
ity to the Internet. Congress might instead hold
off and pass a more specific Internet anti-discrimi-
nation law, which limits itself to accessibility con-
cerns and fleshes out the private/public overlap
within the Internet's network structure.3 68 In any
case, a thorough debate for either expanding old
or creating new legislation probably assists courts
in preventing potential loopholes that a rushed
Title II amendment likely produces.
362 See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the publisher/distributor issues involved when ISPs
provide chat room services to their members).
363 See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C.
1998) (holding that an ISP was not liable for hosting a web-
site that allegedly posted defamatory remarks of White House
employees).
364 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
365 See id. at 50. This fact pattern is similar to the one in
Blumenthal where AOL was sued for hosting the Drudge Re-
port, which allegedly posted libelous claims about several
White House aides in the Clinton Administration. The D.C.
District Court noted that AOL had no "substantive or edito-
rial involvement" in Mr. Drudge's website articles and was
.nothing more than a provider of an interactive computer
service on which the Drudge Report was carried." Id.
366 See id. at 51-52 (describing how the CDA grants the
ISP immunity for the content originating from its members
and not itself); see also supra Part III.C (discussing the uncon-
stitutional practice of content regulation of speech).
367 See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51 (quoting Zeran v.
Am. Online Inc, 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997) ("None
of this means, of course, that the original culpable party who
posts defamatory messages would escape accountability").
However, the hypothetical plaintiff would still have to prove
that the private website was a "place of public accommoda-
tion," see Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1276
IV. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF CHAT
ROOM MONITORING
Removing Title II jurisdiction from Internet
chat rooms will not necessarily turn it into a "ha-
ven for hate speech. '"3 6 9 Indeed, the private sec-
tor still has a number of potential solutions availa-
ble that are free from Noah's government-spon-
sored constraints. In this regard, one wonders
whether ISPs are using the CDA and First Amend-
ment protections to avoid any responsibility in
ameliorating the often uncontrolled and rowdy
nature of chat room discussion. After all, AOL
could have easily avoided Mr. Noah's lawsuit by
removing the discriminatory messages after re-
ceiving his alleged e-mail complaints.
Recent developments seem to suggest a more
proactive stance, as major ISPs like MSN have
closed their previously open Internet chat rooms
to the general public.3 70 While this adds to Zeran
and Noah's fears of these forums' eventual clo-
sure,3 71 it could be a positive step in that ISPs can
more effectively manage their chat rooms for con-
tent and taste. Plaintiffs like Mr. Noah may best
be served by these changes, as they would not
have to depend on Title II for a more pleasant
Internet experience.
3 7 2
Of course, time might be the ultimate judge in
controlling chat room conversation. Eventually,
(7th Cir. 1993).
368 Besides the CDA, the government has protected the
Internet from federal/state oversight in other areas. For ex-
ample, Congress in 1998 passed the Internet Tax Freedom
Act, 47 U.S.C. §151 (2000) (later extended in 2001), which
prevented states from collecting federal, state, and local taxes
on Internet access or discriminatory e-commerce taxes for a
three-year period. Currently, Congress is debating whether
to extend the moratorium for another period. Carl Hulse,
Senate Extends Until 2007 Ban on Internet Taxes, N.Y. TIMEs,
April 30, 2004, at A17.
369 But see Siegel, supra note 145 (arguing that hate
speech remains alive and well in internet sites throughout
the world).
370 Laurie J. Flynn, Microsoft's Rivals Won't Shut Chat
Rooms, N.Y.TMES, Sept. 25, 2003, at C5 (detailing MSN's
plans to limit ISP's chat rooms to subscribers only, but point-
ing out that MSN's competitors, such as Yahoo! and AOL
have no plans to limit their website chat rooms to non-paying
customers).
371 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333; see also Noah v. AOL Time
Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.2d 532, 540 (E.D.Va. 2003).
372 See Noah, 261 F. Supp.2d at 534. It would be a lot
simpler if Mr. Noah relies on AOL, rather than the govern-
ment, to provide a better chat room environment since pri-




technology and the financial burden might im-
prove so that Congress may feel justified in repeal-
ing the CDA. In addition, ISPs may not have the
same "distributor" immunity and be forced to re-
move indecent messages of which they have rea-
sonable notice. Of course, this may never happen
so courts should be cautious before attempting to
extend traditional federal regulation into the
cyberspace medium.
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